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Problem Description
We will survey some current cloud computing vendors and compare them to find patterns in how
their feature sets are evolving. The start-up firm dSafe intends to exploit the promises of cloud
computing in order to launch their business idea with only marginal hardware and licensing costs.
We must define the criteria for how dSafe's application can be sufficiently secure in the cloud as
well as how dSafe can get there.
Assignment given: 14. January 2010
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Abstract
Considerations with regards to security issues and demands must be addressed
before migrating an application into a cloud computing environment. Different
vendors, Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services and Google AppEngine, provide
different capabilities and solutions to the individual areas of concern presented by
each application. Through a case study of an online receipt storage application
from the company dSafe, a basis is formed for the evaluation. The three cloud
computing vendors are assessed with regards to a security assessment framework
provided by the Cloud Security Alliance and the application of this on the case
study. Finally, the study is concluded with a set of general recommendations and
the recommendation of a cloud vendor. This is based on a number of security as-
pects related to the case study’s existence in the cloud. With dSafe’s high demands
of data locality, integrity and security, Google AppEngine is discarded as an option
due to the lack of focus on business related applications, whilst Microsoft Azure
is the recommended cloud vendor – closely followed by Amazon Web Services –
due to its suitable technical solutions with regards to existing implementation, risk
mitigation capabilities and audit results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud Computing has long been a buzzword within the field of computer science.
As with most buzzwords there are numerous definitions, but most agree that Cloud
Computing entails putting applications and data in the hands of others. Unless
you run your applications and keep your data on your own hardware on-premises,
you leave the security of said assets in the hands of others. In a world where
applications are riddled with weaknesses and vulnerabilities, can you really trust
another company to keep your assets?
When a computer is within your network, you can protect it with other
security systems such as firewalls and IDSs. You can build a resilient
system that works even if those vendors you have to trust may not be
as trustworthy as you like. With any outsourcing model, whether it
be cloud computing or something else, you can’t. You have to trust
your outsourcer completely. You not only have to trust the outsourcer’s
security, but its reliability, its availability, and its business continuity.
– Bruce Schneier[1]
There are several providers1 available and their platforms differ substantially in
their flexibility. How much of the infrastructure the customer is able to access
can directly affect the security of their own services as well as that of others.
This difference can have critical consequences: Research has been described in
which meticulous analysis of a cloud’s hardware in idealised circumstances allow
attackers to log the keystrokes of users on separate virtual machines [2]. Some of the
cloud platforms are therefore polished surfaces with little access to the underlying
infrastructure and others allow customers to delve deeper.
This report will detail these differences and their consequences for security. By
comparing the platforms we intend to, from a security standpoint, comment on the
maturity of a selected set of current cloud computing vendors. In addition, we will
be performing a case study on the start-up business dSafe. dSafe intends to create a
1In this report we will use vendor and provider interchangeably.
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information system with the entire Norwegian people as potential users and deploy
it off-premises, in the care of a cloud vendor. dSafe has tentatively chosen the
Windows Azure platform. Our intention is to find out if dSafe’s planned system
can be deployed securely to the cloud. There are several aspects to this problem,
perhaps the most important of which are the technical and legal. In both, utilising
cloud technology has clear ramifications. To complicate matters, as we will see in
the beginning of Chapter 2, there is only a somewhat consensus on what cloud
technology actually is.
In the remainder of this chapter, we present our research methodology.
1.1 Research Questions
The research questions establish the scope of the study.
Q1: Can information systems be as secure in the cloud as they would be in an
on-premises environment?
Has the cloud matured to the point where it is possible to create reasonably secure
cloud systems? That is, at least as secure as non-cloud systems. The core is-
sues of confidentiality, integrity and availability become extra important whenever
outsourcing data servers due to the inclusion of an external data provider.
Q2: How can the planned services of dSafe be sufficiently secured in the cloud?
We will analyse dSafe’s business plan as well as design documents to find out how
dSafe can deploy its intended services sufficiently secure on the platform of their
chosen vendor as well as those of other vendors. What we deem to be sufficiently
secure for dSafe will also be explored as a part of the aforementioned analysis.
The next section will elaborate on how we intend to answer these questions.
1.2 Approach
Our answering of the research questions consists of three steps:
1. Comparative study of cloud vendors (Chapter 2).
2. Understanding the case (Chapter 3).
3. Case study of an online receipt archive (Chapter 4).
Even though some quantitative data exists in most of the cases (e.g. how many
applications that run on the different platforms), these do not let us extrapolate any
useful conclusions regarding security. Most of the sources we base our discussion
on are either research papers, technology papers, our own experience with the
platforms or other users’ experiences. In addition we consult the publicly available
information and documentation on the respective vendors’ websites.
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1.2.1 Comparative Study
In order to answer our research questions we first need to understand the challenges
that await in the cloud as well as familiarise ourselves with cloud vendors. We
intend to proceed in the following steps:
• Introduce cloud computing: First we present what we deem to be essen-
tial knowledge and terminology within the field of cloud computing.
• Introduce cloud vendors: In Section 2.3 we consider vendors and present
the capabilities of the ones we deem relevant. The number of vendors studied
should not exceed three, in order to limit the scope of the study. These
vendors are selected by applying the following criteria:
– The vendor should be a large market participant within the cloud, and
other areas based on data centers, to ensure future availability of ser-
vices.
– The vendor’s platform can accommodate dSafe’s planned system.
– The vendors should be different in nature, to ensure that not only ven-
dors, but also different cloud approaches, are explored.
– Sufficient information must be present on the vendor, in order to do a
qualified reasoning about the vendor’s properties relevant to the appli-
cation.
• Investigate security aspects: In Section 2.4 we identify security aspects
and investigate the different vendors’ capabilities within each aspect.
• Summary: Finally, we intend to find some patterns in the vendors’ capabil-
ities and intentions.
1.2.2 Understanding The Case
In understanding the case, we have had four meetings with dSafe in which we
discussed their business plans and design documents. During the course of our
writing, we keep email correspondence ongoing to be able to keep up to date with
dSafe’s progression. The documents and the other information acquired form the
basis for our dSafe presentation in Chapter 3.
1.2.3 Case Study
In this study we utilise a framework laid out by the Cloud Security Alliance: Secu-
rity Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing [3], specifically its
second major revision. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)’s mission statement is:
To promote the use of best practices for providing security assurance
within Cloud Computing, and provide education on the uses of Cloud
Computing to help secure all other forms of computing. – CSA
3
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A fairly new security endeavour (conceived late 2008) for a fairly new field. The
Alliance has quickly gained a great many affiliate and corporate members. This
includes affiliates such as The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
and Jericho Forum, while the corporations include Microsoft, Google, Dell, HP,
Symantec, VeriSign and VMWare 2. The paper itself is co-authored by a cohort of
security experts from the different member organisations divided into into worker
groups. These worker groups are responsible for the guidance within the 13 different
domains as defined by the master paper 3.
The first domain, Cloud Architecture details the field of Cloud Technology and
introduces the terminology. This domain, as well as the following six governance
domains and six operational domains are intended to exhaustively cover any and
all security aspects that companies should consider when contemplating deploying
information systems in the cloud. We have found that some of the domains have
overlapping aspects and so we do not follow the guidance too stringently as we
make our recommendations to dSafe.
In order to answer question two, we intend to follow the following steps:
1. Identify and classify assets: In Section 4.1 we determine any and all assets
dSafe has based on the information presented in Chapter 3, both current and
future. After all assets have been identified we determine the risk associated
with six scenarios. These scenarios are related to information disclosure and
outside manipulation and are detailed in Section 4.1.2.
2. Deployment Model Acceptance: In Section 4.2 we determine what cloud
model is acceptable for the identified assets.
3. Analyse dSafe in the context of domains: In Section 4.3, within the
context of the twelve domains, we make recommendations for how dSafe
should proceed in order to mitigate the risks we have uncovered.
4. Risk Mitigation: Finally, in Section 4.4 we summarise what vendors provide
mitigations within each domain to visualise the of each platform.
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Figure 1.1: The process of recommending a provider based on the case’s application
assets, the providers’ security aspect capabilities and adherence to deployment
models.
2See http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/Membership.html
3See http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance.html
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1.3 Report Outline
The report is divided into five parts.
• Introduction: This chapter, which introduces the problem description as
well as our methodology for solving the problem.
• Cloud Computing: The chapter explores what cloud computing is and
what it means for software security. It will include an analysis of what security
challenges the cloud poses and what mechanisms the different providers have
implemented to meet said challenges.
• Case Overview: The chapter explores this newly started firm. This in-
cludes the firm’s business plan, their vision, and an analysis of their security
challenges.
• Case Study: The chapter contains our analysis of their business idea, an
online receipt archive, and the viability of placing their services in the cloud
while maintaining the security of their clients.
• Conclusions: In the final chapter we intend to answer the research questions
posed in this chapter, as well as describe what further work that needs to be
done.
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Chapter 2
Cloud Computing
For decades, companies have been buying and maintaining their own computational
infrastructure for hosting Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP), web pages and business web portals. This infrastruc-
ture has been scaled to handle the largest amount of traffic realistic to the business.
For online shopping this means that the infrastructure must handle the Christmas
shopping season, for weather reporting portals this means the amount of traffic
usually present after a hurricane and for universities this means the enrollment pe-
riod, where all student are required to register for classes. The rest of the time, the
system usually works at a sub-optimal utilisation, meaning that the organisation
has idle computational resources. If enterprises with non-overlapping high-demand
time periods were to share the computational power and further utilise this more
uniformly, one would approach a more effective usage of the resources. The cen-
tralised maintenance and operation of the computers would also entail a more
cost-effective operational model, due to the larger degree of specialisation such
a computer farm organisation would allow compared to the average in-house IT
operator.
But what about the different platforms and technologies needed by the different
users of this centralised computer center scheme? One clearly needs different envi-
ronments running on these servers in order to meet the need of every customer and
to guarantee some sandboxing and protection of data and processing done for each
user. This is solved through virtualisation. In short, virtualisation is one com-
puter acting like many. Some virtualisation software run on the hardware while
the operating systems and user-specific software runs in instances on top.
In order for these services to run seamlessly, one is dependent on some kind of
fault tolerance and redundancy. If all users were running on top of a single point
of failure, the Service Level Agreement (SLA) would not seem very appealing for
anyone to accept. Therefore, one is dependent on running multiple computers with
seamless backup switching, replacement of fault hardware, adding more computa-
tional power if needed – all transparent to the user. To make this happen, the
7
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computer farm providers use a technique called grid computing which is making
many computers act like one logical unit.
Essentially, cloud computing is a combination of virtualisation and grid comput-
ing. In essence, this scheme allows the end user to not care about the underlying
infrastructural architecture. The virtualisation part allows the user to have an
exclusive environment to work on and the grid computing part allows the system
to be as scalable and fault tolerant as expected for a dedicated system. While
this description of cloud computing is simplified and focused on the infrastructural
architecture, other definitions exist:
Dynamic provisioning of IT capabilities over the network.
– Henrik Lund-Hanssen, Master Architect, Accenture
Cloud computing is a way of computing, via the Internet, that broadly
shares computer resources instead of having a local personal computer
handle specific applications.
– Wikipedia.org
What is cloud computing all about? Amazon has coined the word “elas-
ticity” which gives a good idea about the key features: you can scale
your infrastructure on demand within minutes or even seconds, instead
of days or weeks, thereby avoiding under-utilization (idle servers) and
over-utilization (blue screen) of in-house resources. With monitoring
and increasing automation of resource provisioning we might one day
wake up in a world where we don’t have to care about scaling our Web
applications because they can do it alone.
– Markus Klems, Student
People are coming to grips with Virtualization and how it reshapes IT,
creates service and software based models, and in many ways changes a
lot of the physical layer we are used to. Clouds will be the next transfor-
mation over the next several years, building off of the software models
that virtualization enabled.
– Douglas Gourlay, VP of Marketing, Arista Networks
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction.
– Peter Mell and Tim Grance, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
Cloud computing is about gracefully losing control while maintaining
accountability even if the operational responsibility falls upon one or
more third parties. – Cloud Security Alliance [3]
These definitions differ somewhat, but the concepts of resource utilisation and how
virtualisation allows the user to focus on the services repeat themselves as the most
8
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important advantages of cloud computing throughout these definitions. The final
definition ignores these aspects, instead focusing specifically on the security aspect.
This chapter consists of the following sections:
• Service Models: This section presents and establishes the three differ-
ent service models from the literature: Software-as-a-Service, Platform-as-
a-Service and Infrastructure-as-a-Service.
• Deployment Models: This section presents the five different cloud deploy-
ment models: public, on- and off-premises private, community and hybrid.
• The Cloud Vendors: Here we present some cloud vendors and their differ-
ent components. These are the providers we discuss throughout the the rest
of this report.
• Cloud Security Aspects: The cloud infers many challenges for the com-
pany wishing to put their applications and data in it. There are many differ-
ent aspects to consider from the security perspective: E.g. security audits,
certifications, security incidents or resource pooling.
• Summary: Finally, we compare the vendors to look for patterns between
them.
2.1 Service Models
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the cloud computing layers
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As the array of definitions has shown us, cloud computing seems to be a rather
abstract concept and is usually concretised into more tangible categories. If a
service is running on the cloud it can usually be called cloud computing as long as
it runs on a specialised computer system with virtual environments, or spaces, for
each user. This encompasses not only applications, such as Google Mail or Docs,
but also the virtualisation of operating systems, rendering the user more freedom
compared to the application schema. As such, the cloud computing services is
usually concretised into these categories based on the taxonomy defined by Youseff
et al.[4], also shown in Figure 2.1:
• Application layer: Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
• Platform layer: Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
• Infrastructure layer: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
Regardless of which definition of Cloud Computing one accepts it might sound
similar to outsourcing. Hence a clarification is useful:
Cloud Computing in general can be distinguished from traditional out-
sourcing in three ways: the time of service (on-demand and intermit-
tent), the anonymity of identity of the service provider(s) and anonymity
of the location of the server(s) involved. – Cloud Security Alliance[3]
As we move from SaaS through PaaS to IaaS this difference becomes more evi-
dent. The following quick treatise on the different categories will explain further.
Figure 2.2 attempts to categorise Google AppEngine, Amazon Web Services and
Windows Azure in the cloud computing service layer model.
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Figure 2.2: Categorisation of Google AppEngine, Amazon Web Services and Win-
dows Azure According to the Cloud Service Models.
2.1.1 Software-as-a-Service
These services run on the cloud application layer. A service provider license appli-
cation access based on demand. The service is usually hosted in an environment
10
CHAPTER 2. CLOUD COMPUTING 2.2. DEPLOYMENT MODELS
controlled fully by the service provider, eliminating the need for the user to install
and maintain the application. Examples are Google Mail, a mail application only
accessible by web, and SalesForce.com, a business software company, running all
applications on a hosted off-site purchased through subscriptions to the service.
This scheme allows end users to neglect the cost of hardware, licenses and the
maintenance of the infrastructure. According to [5], the SaaS segment is the only
segment proven to be successful as a business model.
2.1.2 Platform-as-a-Service
In this layer, a platform or a solution stack is provided that exists on top of the
cloud infrastructure which is transparent to the user. The platform service segment
facilitates the cloud applications which the user may deploy in this environment.
Examples are Windows Azure, the Google AppEngine and Amazon Web Services.
If one needs an environment on which to deploy and host custom application,
the PaaS offers more dynamic functionality compared to the rigid and application
specific environment of the SaaS. Consequently, the customer is more directly
responsible for the reliability and security of the service provided to the end user.
2.1.3 Infrastructure-as-a-Service
The infrastructure is the most fundamental service segment. The suppliers of this
service provide the storage and processing capabilities needed to run the abovemen-
tioned services. The IaaS may include managed hosting, development platforms or
otherwise clean virtual machine instances reachable through the remote vendor. In
this segment as well, Amazon is a big market operator, but also other well-known
companies, such as IBM, are present with managed hosting services. Further, not
much effort is usually needed in order to find a local supplier of remote virtual ma-
chine environments. In the IaaS category, the customer is even more responsible
for the reliability and security of the services they provide.
2.2 Deployment Models
To differentiate between cloud implementations considerably different in nature, a
set of deployment models have been defined – similar to how the service models
(see Section 2.1) have been defined. We will give a short run-down on the different
models here based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
definition [6, 3].
2.2.1 Public cloud
This cloud infrastructure is accessible by the general public or a cluster of organ-
isations. This system is hosted, managed and owned by an organisation selling
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Figure 2.3: Overview of the cloud computing deployment models
cloud services. This means that a multitude of people and corporations put their
applications and storage into the same cloud infrastructure. Entities looking for
cloud capabilities should consider this fact immensely before deciding on a cloud
provider.
2.2.2 Private cloud
This cloud infrastructure is operated solely for one organisation. There are two
types of private clouds:
• The private internal cloud: The organisation acquires the necessary hard-
ware and maintains it for itself.
• The private external cloud: The organisation pays a cloud provider to
provide this as a service.
2.2.3 Community cloud
This cloud infrastructure is operated for multiple organisations with a set of shared
concerns – typically cooperative, mission- or domain specific concerns. As with the
private cloud, this environment may be managed or hosted by the organisations,
or any third party vendors.
2.2.4 Hybrid cloud
This cloud infrastructure is a combination of two or more of the above models. The
clouds composing a hybrid cloud remain unique entities and are bound together
12
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by technology allowing communication between the clouds. Applications of this
technology can include load-balancing and application portability, which makes
the hybrid useful in different contexts, including high-load environments or when
processing redundancy is needed.
2.3 The Cloud Vendors
In this section, we will explore some providers of cloud technology. As briefly
stated in the introduction (Section 1.2) these specific providers are chosen based on
some criteria. All three selected providers fit all these criteria based on a qualified
reasoning on todays standing in the cloud computing market. In summary the
vendors chosen for this comparative study are:
• Windows Azure: Fairly new, it graduated from beta status January 1,
2010.
• Amazon Web Services: The oldest platform in the study, launched in July
of 2002.
• Google AppEngine: The middle child, launched April 7, 2008.
2.3.1 Windows Azure
Windows Azure is a platform that provides a Windows-based environment for
running applications and storing data in Microsoft data centers. In short, Windows
Azure is a an operating system available as an online service. The platform runs
on a large number of machines accessible though the internet. On top of this
environment, the computation and storage services exist as own layers. A thorough
overview on the platform can be found in David Chappell’s white paper on the
subject from 2009 [7]. The platform consists of three core components:
• Computing: A complex solution built on Microsoft’s HyperV virtualisation
technology, Azure is able to supply a flexible number of virtual machines for
running the actual applications.
• Storage: Azure additionally supplies different types of storage devices to
suit the developers’ needs.
• Fabric: Finally, there is the AppFabric. This fabric is the environment in
one of Microsoft’s data centers that controls all the hardware necessary to
supply the complex services of the first two components.
The computing services are two-fold. Both are virtual machine instances, but only
the web role instances are meant to be visible to end users of the applications. The
worker role is meant to “do the heavy lifting”. By increasing the number of instances
and controlling their access patterns through a load balancer, Azure provides intel-
ligent scalability for developers. To enable communication between these instances,
Azure provides a queueing service. All components of the Azure platform are de-
signed as REST-ful web services that can be accessed through HTTP/HTTPS.
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Microsoft has created an elaborate web site through which developers can deploy,
maintain and supervise their applications. Finally, as signified by the Azure slo-
gans “I know a place that’s different, but familiar” and “I know a place where I
can code in my language” developers can run any applications that runs on the
Windows platform. That is, even though the web role instances come bundled
with Microsoft’s IIS web server, nothing stops developers from installing Apache
Tomcat and running their enterprise Java applications.
2.3.2 Amazon Web Services
Amazon Web Services (AWS) is a collection of infrastructure services. Some of the
most important of these are:
• Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2): A service for uploading, managing and
hosting a virtual machine instance – Amazon Machine Image (AMI) – and
providing a scalable capacity for this instance.
• Simple Storage Service (S3): A web service for storing and retrieving
potentially large amounts of data from the underlying Amazon infrastructure.
• CloudFront: A service for distributing content from the S3-services to the
end user. While supplying dynamic content through some service (EC2), the
CloudFront may deliver static content such as images.
• SimpleDB: A web service for running queries on structured data and pro-
vides the core functionality of a database.
• Simple Queue Service (SQS): A hosted queue for holding messages await-
ing to be sent between components in a distributed application.
Most of the AWS, and all of the above, are not services made directly available to
the end user, but offered as functionality for the developers to use. The services are
available over HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The pricing of the Amazon
Web Services is based on how much it is used. Amazon offers a scalable model,
with the possibility to scale the computational power as needed for the applications
hosted on the EC2 service.
2.3.3 Google AppEngine
Google AppEngine (GAE) is a platform for developing and hosting user-developed
software on infrastructure owned and managed by Google. Until now, Google
has not targeted enterprise customers specifically. On May 19th of 2010, Google
held it’s annual I/O convention. Among the many things presented was the very
relevant Google AppEngine for Business keynote. For Google to be able to target
enterprises they have created an SLA. However, the current SLA is merely a draft
and the enterprise features are still in a beta state.
• Application Hosting: The platform supports an array of technologies with
main focus on Java Virtual Machine (JVM)-running languages and Python,
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and some support of popular web frameworks for these. The platform is
hosted on a virtualised grid system, making Google able to scale the appli-
cations transparently for the user.
• Datastore: Google’s datastore is their approach to create an alternative to
the relational database in the cloud. The data is partitioned and distributed
to achieve redundancy and performance enhancements. Due to the challenges
of running queries against multiple related tables in an SQL database, Google
has implemented a datastore syntax called GQL. This new syntax puts some
restrictions on the selections, e.g. joins are not supported due to the ineffi-
ciencies of multi-machine queries [8]. Select statements in GQL can therefore
be performed on only one table.
• Hosted Structured Query Language (SQL): Still in GAE’s future. This
is Google’s challenger to become a contender in providing reliable cloud func-
tionality for businesses.
• Blob Storage: During the 2010 I/O convention, Google announced Google
Storage for Developers [9]. This service is intended as a direct challenge
to Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (S3). Data put into this storage is
replicated to enable redundancy and scalability and is available through a
Representational State Transfer (REST)ful interface. At time of writing the
service is part of Google Labs (a beta program) and only available to a limited
number of North American developers.
2.4 Cloud Security Aspects
Cloud computing ought to be called swamp computing and we don’t even
know what the alligators are yet. – Adrian Seccombe
The vendors and their technologies are presented in Chapter 2. After establishing
which cloud providers should be a part of the study we then choose different security
aspects and surveyed the vendors in each aspect. In determining which aspects to
investigate we tried to be exhaustive and we consulted an array of sources. The
major ones are:
• Gartner’s Seven cloud-computing security risks [10].
• Jericho Forum’s Commandments [11].
• The Cloud Security Alliance’s Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus
in Cloud Computing [3].
The top two sources contain subsets of the bottom one. The latter source is very
thorough and we have been unable to locate any other security aspects not covered
within. By looking at the vendors through the goggles of each security aspect
we intend to discover whether there are any major differences between how they
approach security on the whole.
These groups frequently tout their members, and others – large providers of cloud
computing, such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft, both directly and through
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media. An increased focus from these companies will surely benefit the end user
when it comes to security. A focus on security and the adoption of taxonomies
and standards set by respected specialist organisations does not only gain the user
of the service, but also the cloud providers themselves. According to Schneier[1],
cloud computing is no different from other computing other than the trust you
have in the provider. In order for the large providers to gain this trust, it is critical
that advice originating from a specialist organisation, such as CSA is taken into
account – since these organisations are typically comprised of both large providers
and large consumers of cloud computing.
In this section we investigate the capabilities and stances of the different vendors
from Section 2.3. The aspects we have chosen are the following:
• Service Level Agreements and Compliance Features: The different
providers have different SLAs that define what amount of downtime is deemed
acceptable. What are the main differences between vendors and do any of
them even make guarantees? All customers must accept these agreements if
they wish to deal with these providers.
• Authentication Services: These services are essential in providing in-
tegrity, confidentiality and access control to both customers and the users
of their applications, whether in the cloud or not.
• Audit and Certifications: What guarantees do customers have as to the
manner in which cloud vendors process the data entrusted in their care? For
a company to choose to be certified is a strong, public signal that they take
their responsibilities seriously.
• Cloud Tech Support: Outsourcing data center operations means that the
customer does not have full control over their information system. When
security incidents such as attempted break-ins occur; who is contacted?
• Incident Response and Logging: The information system with human
or machine interfaces will be constantly subjected to both illegal and legal
access. Since the hardware and software that runs the information system in
the cloud it is vital that customers are notified of security incidents in the
cloud and are able to respond properly without being hindered by lack of
physical access.
• On-demand Self-service: This aspect of cloud computing can cause com-
plications for the security policies of the customer. Several customers on the
same hardware may have adverse effects on their ability to access log informa-
tion and some vendors might not let customers perform penetration testing
on their production systems.
• Broad Network Access: This aspect is about how cloud systems are de-
signed to allow the consuming of services from numerous platforms and de-
vices.
• Resource Pooling: Outsourcing data center operations means leaving data
center operations in the hands of a third party vendor. The vendors pool
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resources in data centres across the globe and this might have legal conse-
quences for customers. Does the customer have any control as to where the
data goes?
• Internal Access Control: Do the vendors have internal controls in place
for authorising administrative personnel to access the customers data? The
customer needs assurances to this effect.
• Virtualisation: For multi-tenant cloud services to be provided at infrastruc-
ture, platform or application level, the use of virtualisation is inevitable for
the provider to remain cost efficient. It is the multi-tenant part that can ad-
versely affect the security of customers’ applications. Does the virtualisation
technology compartmentalise sufficiently?
2.4.1 Service Level Agreements and Compliance Features
The different providers have different SLAs that define what amount of downtime
is deemed acceptable. What are the main differences between vendors and do any
of them even make guarantees?
All customers must accept these agreements if they wish to deal with these providers.
The amount of time that services are available divided by the total time it was sup-
posed to be available becomes the percentage known as uptime. This uptime is
often referred to as a “number of nines”. For instance, four nines means 99.99 %.
This equates to about 53 minutes out of 365 days and is certainly very impressive.
We shall now see what guarantees, if any, the providers make regarding service
levels. We will also take a look at what features the different providers have im-
plemented to achieve their SLA-stated goals. These intentions regarding uptime
might seem impressive but the SLAs makes it clear that the service credits are the
only compensation the customer is eligible for. Note that each SLA describes these
Service Credits. The credits are percentages of the usage fees that are reimbursed
when certain criteria regarding uptime are reached. The downtime is usually cal-
culated as an accumulation of five minute periods a service is unavailable. We will
say otherwise when that is not the case. Any downtime occurring for less than five
minutes is not counted however many such outages occur.
Windows Azure
Microsoft has four different SLAs which each define uptime and compensation for
failure to satisfy these limits:
• Azure Compute: For both monthly connectivity downtime and monthly role
instance uptime, the system is designed to reach at least 99.99 % uptime. If
it drops below this, a 10 % service credit is given. This service credit further
increases to 25 % when it falls below 99.95 % [12].
• Azure Storage: Service credits are 10 % below 99.9 % and 25 % be-
low 99 %. The method for calculating this monthly uptime is 100 % −
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average error rate . The average error rate is based on a set of operations
and their acceptable completion time. Further details can be found in the
Azure Storage SLA [13].
• SQL Azure: A period of five minutes is determined as “unavailable” if all
the customer’s connections fail or take more than 30 seconds to conclude.
The number of unavailable periods is counted and the monthly availability
service level is determined in a straight forward manner. The limits are also
here 99.9 % and 99 % with the corresponding service credits [14].
• AppFabric: The calculation is equivalent to the one described for SQL
Azure. The connectivity in question here is the one between “either the
Access Control Service or the Access Control Service Management Service
endpoints and Microsoft’s internet gateway” [15].
Microsoft has put in place an impressive set of measures to provide these availability
and reliability goals [7]:
• Load Balancing: In Windows Azure, all resources such as virtual machines
(web and worker roles) and storage nodes are protected by load balancers.
This is done to prevent single instances from being overworked.
• Redundancy:
– All the different types of storage available (Blobs, Tables and Queues)
in Windows Azure are all backed up with triple redundancy as of this
writing [16].
– Fault Domains are something Microsoft has implemented transparently
for the user. In effect, the hardware in Microsoft’s data centers are
divided into these domains. When services scales up the AppFabric
makes sure to spread the instances evenly between the fault domains in
the data center. In this way they avoid that when certain hardware fails
not every instance of a customer’s service fails.
– Upgrade Domains are somewhat related to Fault Domains in that worker
and web role instances in upgrade domain one can be upgraded while
the ones in domain two are upgraded after a) the instances in domain
one are fully upgraded and b) new traffic is directed to domain one. This
makes for close to painless upgrades of instances in Microsoft’s cloud.
Amazon Web Services
Amazon has two somewhat different SLAs for their two types of services [17, 18]:
• AWS S3 Storage: When the uptime percentage drops below 99.99 % the
client is eligible for a 10 % service credit on his monthly billing. When it
drops below 99.95 %, the discount is increased to 25 %.
• AWS EC2: When the uptime percentage drops below 99.9 % uptime, the
client is eligible for a 10 % service credit on his yearly billing.
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To achieve these uptime levels Amazon claims that “AWS will use commercially
reasonable efforts”. There are two kinds of features for achieving this: implemented
by Amazon and implementable by the customer [19].
• Load Balancing: Elastic Load Balancing is a transparent feature imple-
mented by Amazon. It hides all your identical instances behind an alias,
taking care of balancing the load between the instances [19].
• Name Service: When new instances are created they are automatically
given both a public and a private IP address. The customer may exchange
this public address with an Elastic IP address instead. Elastic addresses are
a kind of dynamic IP address that overcomes that problem of Domain Name
System (DNS) propagation latency on the public internet.
• Redundancy:
– The EC2 cloud is divided into availability zones that comprise regions.
By placing storage and computing instances in several regions across
availability zones the customer is able to influence and increase the re-
liability of his services since these zones are maintained as completely
independent of each other. Amazon provides Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) that enables what they call Auto Scaling. As the name
implies this allows the customer to program in rules for how the num-
ber of EC2 and S3 storages are duplicated to cope with increasing and
decreasing load. The CloudWatch feature gathers metrics to enable this
rule programming.
– The Amazon Elastic Block Store is a persistent storage volume that can
be attached to EC2 instances. These volumes are stored with a redun-
dant copy inside availability zones. When computers fail for different
reasons the storage volumes connected to it may end up with less than
intact integrity. Amazon’s block store is designed so that the integrity
of volume is sustained even when EC2 instances fail. This enables new
instances to immediately connect to the storage volume without delay.
• Protection: Amazon has implemented several protections against Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks [20]: SYN cookies1 and connection limiting. In addi-
tion Amazon maintains internal bandwidth that is greater than the Internet
Service Provider (ISP)-given bandwidth given to EC2 and S3 instances to at
least make sure that internal communication can continue unhindered.
Google AppEngine
For its enterprise customers Google has now provided a tentative SLA [21]. Sim-
ilarily to the other providers it aims to provide Service Credit Refunds when the
service level drops below predefined boundaries. When the monthly service level
drops below 99,9 % the customer receives a 10 % discount, below 99 % yields 25 %,
below 95 % yields 50 %. What sets Google’s scheme apart from the others is that
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_cookies
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when the service level drops below 90 % the discount becomes 100 %. The same
kind of accumulation of five-minute periods of downtime as the other providers do
is applicable here.
Google provides automatic scaling and load balancing but few details have been
published [22]. Among the available APIs that are published for Java and Python
a simple blacklist filter for DoS protection is described. The recent publication
of their Google AppEngine for Business program indicates that they will open up
further in the future as enterprises start pressuring them for more information and
features.
2.4.2 Authentication Services
These services are essential in providing integrity, confidentiality and access con-
trol to both customers and the users of the customers’ applications, whether in
the cloud or not. Before this age of cloud computing the development of such fea-
tures have rested completely with the developers. We will see if any of the cloud
vendors have prepared facilities for assisting their customers with this. In building
general infrastructures the vendors become uniquely suited to affect the security of
customers’ applications that run on it.
Windows Azure
Microsoft has implemented something simply called Access Control (AC). This
is based on on a specification called WS-Federation2 which was co-developed by
IBM, Microsoft, Novell and VeriSign and details how federated identity can be
implemented across web services. It details mechanisms for allowing information
brokering on identities and authentication [23]. AC implements this claims-based
identity model. This model is also detailed in a presentation from the Jericho
Forum [24], but Microsoft’s implementation is detailed in [25]. A simplification
of the model follows: In such a model the user of the service, i.e. the store,
authenticates with an authenticating service that supplies a token for use with the
real services provided. The token is a set of attributes (called claims) concerning
an identity, for instance a username, an e-mail address or a set of privileges. In this
manner one avoids transferring the password every time a receipt upload occurs.
Instead the token is passed whenever operations are performed until the token
expires. The tokens are designed to include digital signatures to enable quick and
easy validation. This can then be used as a kind of “single sign-on” service that
can benefit developers greatly. They can now use this service across their services
without having to implement disparate authentication into every web service. This,
arguably, scales better than the alternative. In addition, it allows developers to
authorise partners, e.g. banks, to issue such tokens as well, to ease cross-service
integration.
2See http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/specification/ws-fed/
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In 2009, Microsoft passed their first Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
2.0 interoperability tests, and will most likely in the future be interoperable with
other technologies supporting this eXtended Markup Language (XML)-format.
SAML includes an eGovernment profile. To date, a number of governments have
employed this standard. A federated identity is not a requirement for this service,
but when sharing identity with widely used, trustworthy services, this would most
likely increase the usability of the service and encourage further use.
As Microsoft provides full platform virtualisation in Azure, any technology running
on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 runs in the instance. Therefore, any third party
authentication schemes compatible with the Microsoft platform will work.
Amazon Web Services
Amazon has authentication against the various supported services in the AWS
stack. Since the Amazon cloud is mostly an infrastructure cloud, and any platform
can be hosted, it leaves authentication outside the AWS environment up to the
developer – making most authentication implementations possible – but with the
added development overhead.
Google AppEngine
The Google App Engine only have native support of the OAuth3 authentication
protocol. OAuth is now implemented throughout the Google Data API, including
Google Docs, Calendar and YouTube. Although proved working and reliable even
for financial transactions (through projects such as OpenTransact and projects
implementing this library4) OAuth has not yet been adopted by the larger financial
institutions [26]. OAuth, and the similar OpenID has yet to be adopted by security
intensive institutions in Norway due to the lack of trivial security measures, such
as two-factor authentication. There exist solutions mapping OpenID’s to more
personal identities5), such as BankID, but OpenID is not deemed secure enough
for financial and semi-sensitive data. Google App Engine also has an API for the
SAML 2.0 authentication protocol, described in the Windows Azure subsection.
Since AppEngine supports an array of technologies, any authentication tactic avail-
able for implementation through these available technologies is possible.
2.4.3 Audit and Certifications
The main goal of the cloud providers, the data center owners, is to make money.
This will always be the top priority. One can not assume that the provider will have
the best interest of its customers as its top priority. Normally, the provider will
3See http://oauth.net/
4See http://www.opentransact.org/
5Provided as an unofficial product from Norwegian company Signicat (http://signicat.
com/)
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have little direct access to the customers’ data beyond any contracted agreements
between the two parties, but in some cases the provider might take liberties with
the customer data, which would not very likely fall in the customers good grace.
The customers must take responsibility for asking the right questions regarding
control routines and obtaining knowledge about the potential areas for security
vulnerabilities.
To obtain information on the provider’s internal controls, regardless of the certifi-
cations obtained by the cloud provider, it is essential to obtain some commitment
or permission for the customer to conduct external third-party audits. Data cen-
ter internal controls can be tailored to pass some certification, and the details of
the audit are seldom released. The customer should not have to place any trust
in the professional relationship between an internally hired auditor and the cloud
provider.
Due to the strict access and disclosed procedures, a cloud provider will most likely
not accept audit requests from the regular customer – this would not only breach
standing protocols regarding data center security, but would also break the promises
made to the other customers with regards to the security and integrity of their data.
If a large and business critical customer were to request such a review, the provider
would most likely be more lenient on the security protocols. A thorough – and
expensive – audit performed by a large company could also benefit both the data
center provider and the smaller customers. If an audit-program were available for
all customers, this would be highly preferable. Certifications such as SAS70 and
ISO 27001 have been created so that independent parties can perform audits and
certifications, thereby enabling customers to make industry recognised assumptions
in this field.
Both Amazon and Microsoft offer the geolocalisation setting as described in Sec-
tion 2.4.8 but Amazon does not publish the exact addresses of their data centers.
They do this to provide a sort of “security by obscurity” layer on top of all their
other security measures but it also effectively prevents even dSafe from inspecting
the on-site security. Google does not even allow for specifying location, so the
customer would have no idea which data center to inspect.
In 2005 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) completed a standard called ISO/IEC 27001:2005
- Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management
systems – Requirements. We will refer to it simply as ISO 27001. Since this stan-
dard formally specifies a set of requirements to be satisfied, it becomes possible to
audit and certify organisations. The certification process consists of three steps,
the first of which is an informal review of the organisation’s Information Security
Management System [27]. This must consist of an information security policy, a
Statement of Applicability and a Risk Treatment Plan. The Statement of Appli-
cability defines security control measures, the why and where they are needed 6.
6See http://iso-17799.safemode.org/index.php?page=Statement_of_
Applicability
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The Risk Treatment Plan is the result of thorough risk assessments 7. ISO 27001
recommends the Plan Do Check Act-cycle to develop these items. In this iterative
approach you start with charting risks and find security controls, actually imple-
ment them, evaluate their effectiveness and finally make the necessary changes to
optimise security. Step 2 is an actual independent compliance audit to find out
whether the developed Information Security Management System (ISMS) satisfies
the requirements of ISO 27001. This would then result in an actual certification.
Step 3 consists of subsequent follow-up reviews to ensure that the organisation
keeps adhering to the process, possibly leading to decertification. The CSA is “is-
suing an industry call to action to align cloud providers behind the ISO/IEC 27001
certification”. Furthermore, when companies become ISO 27001 certified it is pos-
sible to gain insight into the process, thus learning about the information security
policies of the vendor, by submitting a written request [28].
The SAS 70 certification is a certification created in the USA by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). No organisation based outside
the United States may issue certifications. The CSA underlines that a SAS 70
Type II audit (the most thorough one) only serves to create a snapshot in time of
how the implementation of security protocols corresponds to the documentation.
Windows Azure
Independent, third-party validation OSSC’s (Online Service Security
and Compliance) include Microsoft’s cloud infrastructure achieving both
SAS 70 Type I and Type II attestations (. . . ) – Charlie McNerney, GM,
Business & Risk Management, Microsoft Global Foundation Services
Microsoft is also ISO 27001 certified [29].
Amazon Web Services
A quote from the AWS security whitepaper states the following after listing com-
pliances and certifications given under internal third-party audits:
(. . . ) These certifications provide outside affirmation that AWS has
established adequate internal controls and that those controls are oper-
ating efficiently. AWS will continue efforts to obtain the strictest of
industry certifications in order to verify its commitment to provide a
secure, world-class cloud computing environment.
It seems that Amazon regards these compliances as an affirmation of AWS internal
controls. Implicitly this states that these internal audits is sufficient to confirm
the quality of these controls. We have been unable to locate any public statement
regarding Amazon and ISO 27001 certification.
7See http://iso-17799.safemode.org/index.php?page=risk_treatment_plan
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Google AppEngine
Google’s SAS70 Type II certification is intended to ensure that the following pro-
tocols and controls are in place, as stated by Google:
• Logical security: Provide assurance that only authorized personnel may
access Google Apps production systems.
• Privacy: Controls provide assurance that procedures and policies regarding
the privacy of the customer data in relation to Google Apps.
• Data center physical security: Controls ensuring that Google Apps are
hosted in a protected enveironment.
• Incident management and availability: Ensures that Google provides re-
dundancy to increase availability and that incidents are reported and treated
correctly.
• Change management: Controls providing reasonable assurance that test-
ing and code review is done prior to any changes in the production environ-
ment.
• Organisation and administration: Controls that provide assurance that
management provides the infrastructure and mechanisms to follow up on
initiatives within Google that impact AppEngine.
We have been unable to locate any public statement regarding Google and ISO
27001 certification.
2.4.4 Cloud Tech Support
Essentially outsourcing data center operations to a third party entails that cus-
tomers must understand their options when things go awry. The cloud vendors are
corporate entities who’s prime motivation have been pleasing their shareholders.
While this might not have changed the vendors seem to recognise the cloud cus-
tomers’ need for support. We will here survey the the support capabilities of the
vendors.
Windows Azure
Microsoft’s support capabilities are somewhat difficult to summarise but they offer
mostly the same features as the other providers. Developers can choose different
types of subscriptions that dictates their eligibility for different levels of support.
All professional support is handled through the “Microsoft Online Services Cus-
tomer Portal”. The features available are online reporting, call-back feature, 1:1
support, 24/7/356 availability and Azure-specific forums within the Microsoft De-
veloper Network for community support [30].
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Amazon Web Services
AWS also offers three different levels of support very similar to Google’s offering
[31].
• Free: Community Forum, Service Health Dashboard, and Frequently Asked
Questionss (FAQs).
• Premium - Silver: Business day support according to Pacific Standard
Time, 1:1 support via web based ticketing system.
• Premium - Gold: 24/7/365 availability, 1:1 support via telephone, 1 hour
guaranteed response time on urgent issues.
The premium features pertain to all the infrastructure services such as EC2 and
S3.
Google AppEngine
Google offers three kinds of support [32]:
• So far, developers have only had access to Community Support for which
Google makes no guarantees. This is basically a forum where developers
discuss issues and Google responds to questions from time to time.
• A new model is Operational Support. Google guarantees 1:1 support,
online forms for submitting issues, a targeted 1 hour response time for critical
issues, as well as 24/7 availability for critical issues. This type of support is
confined to system outages, billing & quotas and account management.
• The final model is Premium Developer Support. The same 1:1 support
is guaranteed, a private support portal provided, targeted response times of 8
hours, and the availability is confined to what is defined as business hours in
Pacific Standard Time. This type of support is for technical guidance issues.
2.4.5 Incident Response and Logging
The information system with human or machine interfaces will be constantly sub-
jected to both illegal and legal access. Instrumentation is by many considered to
be a form of art. Fundamentally it comes down to trading some performance for
the availability of system traces. The art lies in what one does with these traces.
These system traces or logs can be used for several purposes. We will see that
cloud providers are very good at providing performance metrics. What is more in-
teresting for the purpose of this study are security metrics. These security metrics
allow for incident analysis and prevention schemes. Such systems are often referred
to as Security Information and Event Management systems. The implementation
of such a system will allow companies to:
• Define and detect security events.
• Create rulesets for dealing with said events.
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• Structure and aggregate different types of logs for auditing.
Windows Azure
The Windows Azure Software Development Kit (SDK) contains several APIs. It al-
lows the programmatic management and retrieval of a lot of information: Windows
Azure logs (on by default), IIS 7.0 log, Windows Diagnostic infrastructure logs (on
by default), Failed Request logs, Windows Event logs, Performance counters, Crash
dumps and Custom error logs 8. All of these items of diagnostic information can
be retrieved by any application through a REST-ful API, allowing monitoring to
occur from both outside and inside the cloud. The format of the data returned
from these requests is a well documented XML structure.
Amazon Web Services
Amazon CloudWatch enables the corresponding functionality in AWS. The AWS
Management Console is for instance able to show graphs of CPU, Disk and Network
metrics but all this data is also available as a REST-ful web service. This data is
aggregated and persisted for two weeks before this temporary storage is recycled.
The format of Amazon’s returned data is very similar to Microsoft’s, being a human
readable XML structure.
Google AppEngine
Google offers an AppStats API for both their Java and Python platforms. This
API lets the application’s owner view request logs and performance metrics:
Appstats retains statistics for the most recent 1,000 requests (approxi-
mately). The data includes summary records, about 200 bytes each, and
detail records, which can be up to 100 KB each. – Google
For both language platforms Google has created way of enabling what they refer
to as the management console for applications. On this console, the metrics are
used to generate graphs and statistics. The API exposes considerably fewer metrics
than Microsoft’s or Amazon’s. This seems logical since Google does not expose any
infrastructural control to its users and does not even publish their infrastructure
metrics on a regular basis.
2.4.6 On-demand Self-service
This is the ability to provide auto-scaling of the compute and storage cloud de-
pending on instance load. For a manually sized instance, this would mean API for
watching the load and scale the instance accordingly. For a dynamic instance, this
8See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee758705(v=MSDN.10).aspx
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would be the ability to closely review the load of the instance and to set an upper
limit of resources assigned to the instance.
Windows Azure
Windows Azure provides the Service Management REST API9 for programmatic
scaling and management of instances. Combined with one or more of the Azure
logging API (see Section 2.4.5 for further details), one can determine the needed
number of instances at any given time. This is not available as an automatic feature,
since it would entail a complex cost model, giving Microsoft complete control over
the costs related to traffic, storage and computational time. Correct use of these
API will provide both rapid elasticity, depending on the algorithm used on the data
interpreted by the measurement service, also provided though the Microsoft API.
Amazon Web Services
Amazon EC2 offer the same capabilities as Azure through the Amazon CloudWatch
services. This set of APIs provide both services for logging – measured services –
(see Section 2.4.5 for further details) and for managing the instances and scaling
the capabilities. Amazon does not provide this as a built-in feature, because of the
cost-scaling implications this would imply.
Google AppEngine
In the AppEngine price model, you pay for what you use, not for what you reserve
and use, as the two above providers. Also, the other providers emulate individual
machines that you can control, Google does not attempt to virtualise individual
machines. This leaves the AppEngine customer with less flexibility, less control
and less options, but makes it easier for the application programmer, rendering
efficient resource utilisation almost transparent. Therefore, services for measuring
capability resources and scaling these are not available for the AppEngine. Since
you have all the compute space in the world available, but only pay for the resources
you use, there is no reason to worry until the data traffic to you application really
takes off and the amount paid to Google starts to look substantial. An upper limit
of cost can be defined through the administrative interface to prevent out-of-budget
scaling.
2.4.7 Broad Network Access
Broad network access means to what degree is computational and storage capabilities
available from different platforms. As more and more internet services use XML-
based, standardised protocols – available over HTTP – the services become more
9Service Management REST API: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
ee460799.aspx
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and more accessible from most devices. This section will focus on HTTP-based
protocols.
Windows Azure
The Windows Azure cloud is strictly public, all resources are meant to be accessed
through web service interfaces (so-called RESTful services). This makes it very
easy to transfer data in or out of this cloud infrastructure.
Amazon Web Services
For AWS the same applies. Resources are meant to be interconnected with the use
of provided REST and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) interfaces. Ama-
zon also offers Virtual Private Cloud; a private off-premises cloud alternative that
offer the same services as the public that can be accessed through IPSec. This
offering is primarily meant for organisations wanting to put parts or all of its intra-
organisational applications in the cloud and not for public services.
Google AppEngine
Contrary to the storage solutions of AWS and Windows Azure GAE’s current
storage services are not connectable from outside the cloud, only the actual ap-
plications in the cloud may do this programmatically. This is not a show-stopper
for dSafe since their storage units were never intended to be accessed outside their
applications. Google does not make recommendations for RESTful services.
2.4.8 Resource Pooling
Resource pooling means grouping together resources, e.g. storage, processing,
memory, network bandwidth and virtual machines, in order to maximise advan-
tages and profits and/or minimise risks. A cloud provider may specify the location
of these resources to some extent, at a higher lever of abstraction (e.g. country,
city), but at the same time availability and data center redundancy promises are
made. So where is your data being processed, stored and sent? We will take a look
at each provider to identify if any of the providers can guarantee the location of
the customer instance.
Windows Azure
When deploying services on Windows Azure, a geo-location option is given in the
deployment UI. One can assign the application to a location with sub-continental
granularity (e.g. North-Europe). One can also define an Affinity group, a group
containing a selected set of your services, making sure that the performance is
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Figure 2.4: Amazon’s Availability Zones. Image adapted from [34].
not degraded due to long distances – these Affinity groups can also be geo-located.
What happens to the data residing on a disaster-struck data center, is not described
in detail, but since legal issues are one of the pros of the geo-location service, stated
by Microsoft themselves[33], one can make the assumption that the data will not
reside outside the area specified even if a data center is made unavailable. Details
regarding location and Affinity group can be found programmatically through the
Service Management REST API.
Amazon Web Services
Amazon also allow you to specify locations for your services. As can be seen in
Figure 2.4 the AWS EC2 offering is divided into availability zones. These zones are
comprised of regions [34]. Each region is designed to operate completely indepen-
dent of the others to ensure continued service. Of course, if customers choose to
keep all their EC2 instances within one single region it will be rendered unavailable
in the case the data center suffers failure. AWS S3 (storage) instances are confined
to specified regions as well.
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Google AppEngine
Google AppEngine does not allow you to specify a location for your services. As
earlier mentioned, App Engine provide compute and storage resources, not a vir-
tual machine running in a data center. Even though the specific algorithms and
routines for resource pooling are unknown, it would be likely that resource pooling
occur since no locality promises are made. If no location data are provided when
uploading the program, Google does not know where you would prefer it being
resident.
2.4.9 Internal Access Control
When an administrator from the provider access the data on the hosting operating
system, this must be thoroughly controlled and logged to prevent any unwanted
changes to data and client instances. A provider administrator should not have
access to the guest Operating System (OS), the hosted system. Any access to
the guest OS should be logged and one should be able to disable password-based
login – utilising only token- or key-based authentication. This is also valid for
outsiders claiming unauthorised access to a system, either logically (electronically)
or physically (by showing up).
Windows Azure
The Microsoft Global Foundation Services (GFS), which manage the cloud infras-
tructure10 and platform for Microsoft online services11, employs a least-privilege
and need-to-know policy model for all employees affiliated with the cloud technolo-
gies [29]. This would also include Azure.
In a section stating how Microsoft applies controls to physical security the Securing
Microsoft’s Cloud Infrastructure whitepaper states that:
Access is restricted by applying a least privilege policy, so that only
essential personnel are authorized to manage customers’ applications
and services. – GFS
This whitepaper is primarily covering the Microsoft cloud, not specifically the Azure
platform – which is hosted on the Microsoft cloud. This would lead us to believe
that this description of physical security would also be valid for data hosted in
Azure, meaning that essential personnel could have access to the the customer
compute instance and data.
10The GFS-managed infrastructure include data center facilities, hardware and components
supporting services and networks.
11The platform supporting the Microsoft online services include compute runtimes such as web
server software, SQL servers, identify and directory stores, name services and other consumable
functions
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Amazon Web Services
According to Amazon [20], they have implemented a two tier security. One security
layer for the AWS administrators, accessing the host OS, running directly on the
data centers; one layer for the guest OS running on virtual machines. These guest
OS are the systems the users get access to.
To access the host OS, the Amazon administrator mush use an individual cryp-
tographically strong Secure Shell (SSH)-key to access the bastion host12. Once
authorised by the bastion, the administrator can escalate privileges to gain access
to a specific host. All accesses are logged and audited on a routinely basis. The
privileges to administrate a host is distributed on a “principle of least privilege”-
basis, which means that after the administrative tasks on the host are complete,
the privileges and access to bastion host are revoked.
The virtual guest OS is completely under the control of the user. The user will
have full privileges on the guest host, with root access to the operating system,
full administrative privileges over applications, services and user accounts. The
Amazon administrator has no access to the guest OS and can not help the user
with strictly administrative issues without a hand-over of control. Many operating
systems provide the possibility to disable password-authentication, forcing key- or
token-based authentication, eg. with a SSH-key pair on a UNIX system. Also, one
would be able to log all root access, by forcing use of the sudo utility for privilege
escalation and enabling shell logging.
For their data centers, Amazon claims to have military grade, multi-tiered phys-
ical access control and security. The exact location of the data centers is never
disclosed to non-pertinent personnel. Both perimeter and building checkpoints
must be cleared before entering the facilities. Amazon claims to have no less than
three separate two-factor authorisation checkpoints. All visitors to the facilities are
strictly controlled and are at all times followed by authorised staff. Physical access
is, for all Amazon employees, issued on a business objective basis, which means
that privileges are immediately revoked when the employee no longer has business
needs within the facility. All physical access is logged and audited, as with data
access.
Google AppEngine
(. . . ) Google is able to hire many of the worlds leading security experts
to protect our systems and conduct cutting-edge security research. Our
data centers are hardened with many of the latest measures in security
precautions, including biometric access controls and multi-tiered secu-
rity perimeters. Furthermore, Google has implemented a multi-layered
security process protocol designed to help keep customer data safe. Our
12A bastion host is a computer fully exposed to attacks, but is design to withstand intrusion
attempts. This specialised machine is located on the public side of a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ)
and is used to access and protect the management plane of the cloud.
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processes have been independently verified in a successful third-party
SAS 70 Type II audit to verify our confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of customer data. – Google Apps [35]
As one can see, this quote comes from Google Apps, but since the AppEngine’s
datastore is powered by mainly the two Google services; Bigtable and Google File
System – both used by an array of Google Apps (such as GMail and Docs), this
leads us to conclude that the published security statements are also valid for the
AppEngine, since the services used are the same and the data is hosted in the same
data centers – covering both logical- and physical access. The information presented
in this particular section will, to a large extent, be based on the knowledge present
about Google Apps data center security from a Google whitepaper – Comprehensive
review of security and vulnerability protections for Google Apps [36].
Many of the same statements regarding physical data access are valid for Google
as the two other discussed providers; the latest in security precautions at the data
centers; multi-factor, multi-layered authentication for access to facilities and server
containers by selected Google personnel.
With regards to logical security, Google has enabled a series of in-depth security
measures to prevent unauthorised access from third parties. Special purpose soft-
ware, both proprietary and commercial software, is used to protect the system.
To prevent security breaches through low level programs, such as interpreters and
compilers, these are modified and secured in multiple layers. Not much is guar-
anteed when it comes to Google employee access to the logical data other than
the restricted access to specific employees and the processes defined and validated
according to internal auditing. Some of the data center processes are verified in
a SAS 70 Type II audit and include both physical- and logical security handling.
This is more thoroughly explained in Section 4.3.1.3.
2.4.10 Virtualisation
For multi-tenant cloud services to be provided at infrastructure, platform or appli-
cation level, the use of virtualisation is inevitable for the provider to remain cost
efficient. As stated in Chapter 2, virtualisation, together with grid computing, are
the backbone of cloud computing as we normally refer to it. There exists several
abstractional variations of virtualisation, but in this section, hardware virtuali-
sation will be addressed. Hardware virtualisation is from now on referred to as
virtualisation. The areas of focus within this subject is shown in Figure 2.5.
Windows Azure
Little is known about the hypervisor used for Windows Azure, and information
has yet to be reported through any official whitepapers. Some information has
been provided by Microsoft through a mail sent to Keith Ward, the Editor of the
publication Virtualization Review13 [37]. It is reported that Windows Azure runs
13See http://virtualizationreview.com
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Figure 2.5: The virtualisation security areas of focus.
on a modified Hyper-V hypervisor, and that this version won’t be available com-
mercially due to the advantage it takes from the specific, homogenous data center
environment running at Microsoft[38]. The hypervisor is connected to a dedicated
fabric controller, ensuring the scalability required for such a cloud environment.
The Virtual Machine (VM) and Hypervisor are transparent to the user, and both
virtualisation and OS management is abstracted away from the user, enabling
full focus on the deployed application rather than the hardware. Virtualization
Review [37] also reveals Microsoft’s plans to offer Windows Server virtual machine
support for Windows Azure, to make it easier for customers to support virtualised
infrastructure spread over both cloud instances and on-premise centers.
With regards to compartementalisation and strength of the VM, many of the weak-
nesses identified for Hyper-V stems from fact that each host has an underlying
Windows OS. Virtualisation and OS live side by side, as shown in Figure 2.6 along
with a similarily featured AWS instance. If one were to look at the “Critical Se-
curity Fix”-release frequency and all the general scrutiny Windows receives, one
can assume that critical weaknesses still exist. Windows is a multipurpose OS, and
adding the hypervisor role obviously doesn’t make it less heavy and more secure.
Tom Bittman, VP and analyst with Gardner believes that running all I/O controls
and other managers through the parent OS will make the architecture prone to “a
single point of failure”.[39] Although this may be valid for the commercial hyper-
visor, it may have been mitigated when customising Hyper-V for Windows Azure.
Windows Azure is not like the average, multipurpose OS, and is specially designed
to run virtual instances on a grid network – major changes have been done, and
strengthening security before launching the cloud environment might very well have
been one of them. Microsoft Online Services teams apply the Security Develop-
ment Lifecycle (SDL) principles which includes security in development, security
by default and security in deployment [40], and if these are followed, this would
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Figure 2.6: The figure shows how the virtualisation and operating system comprise
the virtual machine environment.
strengthen the indication of a more secure Azure hypervisor.
There is no reason to believe that Windows Azure include any third-party security
software, such as firewalls or virus scanners. If highly regarded security software
was included as a part of the solution, the user would not have to put all trust in,
and rely on, one provider without specific security domain knowledge.
Web based management tools are protected by X.509 public-key infrastructure and
transport security is ensured through SSL. All management API are accessed over
REST services, with the same security features as the web based interface [41]. The
Azure administrative web interface is protected by a one-factor password authen-
tication over SSL. In September of 2009, Zend14 announced the Simple Cloud API
project15. This Open Source Software (OSS) project was co-founded by Microsoft,
IBM and others. This PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) API is intended to be
an abstraction layer between the storage services of the cloud providers. To date,
both Microsoft’s and Amazon’s storage services are supported. More projects like
this are likely to surface in the coming years. It is conceivable that the use of such
APIs will likely enhance the security of current and future applications by assisting
customers in their usage of the cloud vendors’ storage APIs.
Amazon Web Services
AWS uses a Xen hypervisor. Each instance is called a virtual private server. The
architecture is depicted in Figure 2.7. On top of physical layer – the Amazon data
14See http://www.zend.com/en/
15See http://simplecloud.org
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centers – the user can specify security rules for incoming requests.Amazon EC2 Instance Isolation 
       Physical Interfaces 
Customer 1 
Xen Hypervisor 
Customer 2 Customer n … 
…
       Virtual Interfaces 
Firewall 
Customer 1 
Security Groups 
Customer 2 
Security Groups 
Customer n 
Security Groups 
AWS admins only 
SSH via bastion 
Audited and reviewed 
Customer only 
SSH, ID/pw, X.509 
Receive root/admin 
Customer only 
Default deny 
Inbound rules 
Figure 2.7: AWS architecture shown together with security measures in customer
instances, security rule management and physical layer. (enStratus and Amazon,
2009)
A highly customised version of the open source Xen hypervisor (from now on re-
ferred to as the hypervisor) from Citrix provides the virtual machine hypervisor
environment to Amazon Web Services. Amazon is active in the contribution to
the project [20]. Historically, Amazon has had their technical focus towards selling
products through a large internet store residing on Amazon data centers, and not
providing virtual machine technology. Citrix is a company specialising in virtual-
isation, networking and cloud in general. The Amazon cloud can be augmented
with technology from third-party vendors, such as enStratus16 and different AMI17
providers, such as TurnKey Linux Virtual Appliance Library18 and Bitnami19 –
each providing security measures at the relevant level of abstraction.
The Xen hypervisor takes advantage of paravirtualisation20. Since calls to the
underlying hardware requires elevated privileges from the user, it is – with the
paravirtualisation scheme – possible to run the guest OS without any elevated
access to Central Processing Unit (CPU) routines. The complete virtualisation
16enStratus provides an interface for accessing AWS data, a two-step encryption scheme, backup
scheduling and encryption and a process for secure AMI bundling.
17The basic unit of deployment to the Amazon EC2 instance.
18See http://www.turnkeylinux.org/
19See http://bitnami.org/
20The hypervisor presents a software interface to access the underlying hardware, similar to,
but not identical to presenting direct access to underlying infrastructure and hardware.
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of the physical resources, results in a security separation between guest OS and
physical hardware [20].
One theoretical weakness with the hypervisor that may plausibly exist is a sand-
boxing issue. It involves injecting a malicious virtual machine on the same physical
location as the target, and then attacking the victim.[2] To identify the physical lo-
cation of any target VM, one can simply start a rather large set of VM’s randomly,
due to the low cost of starting new instances compared to the cost of scaling them
later. Talbot has estimated a 40 % chance of landing a VM on the same location
machine as the target VM. The attacks will mostly consist of stealing encryption
keys, key-stroke attacks and other attacks related to reading the disclosed data.
No reported successful attacks employing this method are published.
The separation of the virtual instances is handled by the hypervisor. As depicted
in Figure 2.7, all traffic must pass through the firewall in the hypervisor layer. The
rules defined in this firewall defines who can access the instance, limiting access to
only authenticated users.
Physical disks are also virtualised to provide virtual disk space for the user. Since
many users share the same hardware, disks are completely wiped prior to other
users gaining access. This ensures that one customer’s data will not be accessible
to other customers, even though the same hardware is being “reused”. The physical
RAM is partitioned in a similar manner as the hypervisor separation of instances,
described in the previous paragraph.
Calls to the administrative interfaces of the instance must be signed by a X.509
certificate or by the proprietary Amazon Secret Access Key21. Using Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) for API calls are not required, but this option is easily available and
recommended by Amazon. Also, a number of security related network features
are included by default [20]. The administrative web interface is protected by a
one-factor password authentication over SSL.
Google AppEngine
I think it will be very sad if we need to use virtualization. (. . . ) It is
hard to claim we will never use it, but we don’t really use it today. -
Luiz Andre´ Barroso, Google
Previously in this section, virtualisation has been defined as a hypervisor providing
virtual machines, or virtual instances of some sort. According to this definition,
and the statements of Google engineer Luiz Andre´ Barroso, Google does not offer
(hardware) virtualisation.
Although this not being strictly relevant for this section, application separation
and application management security measures will be discussed here, due to the
comparative interest for these areas and the similiar Amazon Web Services and
Windows Azure virtual machine separation and management API security. The
GAE management console is exclusively provided over SSL and authentication is
21When signing up for an AWS account, a Secret Access Key is issued to the customer.
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done with a Google federated identity, a one-factor password authentication also
used for other Google products. Authentication is done over forced SSL.
Since all user applications are run in a non-specific environment, Google does not
allow the user to access the file system for file storage. All persisted data must go
through a storage API. Since both processing and data is made transparent through
the abstraction API, not much information can be derived from wether or not the
data is separated, but since all storage and processing are done through a strictly,
programmatically accessible API, the possibilities of vulnerability exploitation are
minor. One of the most talked about might-be issues, are problems identified in the
Python interpreter[42]. These issues might be translated to the interpreter running
on the App Engine. Guido van Rossum states in an interview that these issues are
being taken care of, by both sandboxing each user instance, selecting which core
modules are to be supported in the Python environment – based on some security
criteria – and hardening the interpreter itself. In addition, more in-depth security
measures are implemented, but more detailed information on these measures are
disclosed.
According to Google, by April 6th 2010, their AppEngine has had over 250 million
page views and the community consists of over 250 thousand developers[43]. Even
with this usage, few issues have been identified, let alone published for the world
to see.
2.5 Summary
The key takeaway for security architecture is that the lower down the
stack the cloud service provider stops, the more security capabilities and
management consumers are responsible for implementing and managing
themselves. – Cloud Security Alliance [3]
The security implications of the services built upon the different platforms can
in this non-quantifiable way be measured by how much of the infrastructure is
available from SaaS through PaaS to IaaS. Figure 2.2 showed that the cloud
vendors do not necessarily stay with a single model. While Microsoft has kept
to the PaaS model, both Google and Amazon offer services within two models.
These differences due to feature complexity are not only apparent between the
three service models but also between vendors within each model.
Are there any major differences between the vendors?
• Service Level Agreements and Compliance Features: The only dif-
ferences to speak of are the tiny differences in the amount of discount the
customer is entitled to.
• Authentication Services: Microsoft’s Access Control Service, part of its
AppFabric offering, enables very easy use of federated identity services across
companies in a secure manner. Neither Amazon nor Google offer the same
functionality to the same extent.
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• Audit and Certifications: All vendors are both Type I and Type II SAS70
certified, but only Microsoft is ISO 27001 certified to date.
• Cloud Tech Support: No real differences to speak of. All vendors provide
1:1 support around the clock support at differing price levels.
• Incident Response and Logging: Nor here are there large differences.
Google offers somewhat less accessible information since it is a SaaS vendor.
• On-demand Self-service: Both Microsoft and Azure offer APIs for pro-
grammatic scaling and easy control over the customers instances. Google
merely allows an on/off switch and handles issues related to scaling.
• Broad Network Access: There seems to be a consensus across the surveyed
vendors to provide RESTful APIs, thus enabling the consuming of services
from any platform in an open and standardised way.
• Resource Pooling: Both Microsoft and Amazon have come to the conclu-
sion that the customer should be allowed to limit the geographic dispersion
of their applications and data. To date, Google does not offer this control.
• Internal Access Control: All surveyed vendors claim to take access control,
both physical and virtual, very seriously. They have implemented military
grade perimeter security and access auditing.
• Virtualisation: Google AppEngine differ from the other two platforms by
not providing traditional hardware virtualisation, and therefore not giving
any notion of a virtual machine or the possibility to administrate this for
the user. Amazon Web Services and Windows Azure are more similar in
nature, albeit Azure relies on a completely proprietary platform compared
to Amazon’s Xen hypervisor and the possibility for including third party
software. Due to the lack of instance control, AppEngine is not a regarded
as a good solution for the dSafe application.
What do the differences just summarised say about these vendors? There does not
seem to be any large differences. After trying to locate information and specifica-
tions for several months, it has become our experience that the surveyed vendors
all try to be open and transparent and still they maintain many business secrets.
This gets in the way of potential customers’s security needs. Companies consid-
ering going into the cloud will need to continue pushing for transparency if they
want to be guaranteed the security of having their own private data center.
In this comparative study three PaaS vendors were surveyed: Microsoft, Amazon
and Google. As might be expected from vendors that compete in the same PaaS
segment, their feature sets seem to be converging. Each vendor tries to become
par with the other vendors while also creating that new feature to give them that
elusive business edge. There are three good examples of this: First, Microsoft’s new
platform has taken a lot of cues from AWS by facilitating programmatic scaling of
applications as well as allowing the setting of affinity groups. Second, Google has
very recently decided to create a storage solution that specifically targets Amazon
and Microsoft’s current storage services. And third, all the surveyed vendors are
at a consensus of supporting RESTful web services as communication interfaces.
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Chapter 3
Case Overview
This chapter contains a description of the start-up business dSafe. We analyse
their business plan as well as their design documents to find implications for sys-
tem security. dSafe always intended cloud deployment of their system, specifically
on Microsoft’s Azure platform. We therefore intend to conclude whether dSafe’s
application can be adequately secured on this platform. From this security per-
spective, both legal and practical angles are taken into consideration.
This chapter contains the following sections:
• The Company: Details regarding the company such as leadership structure
and the reasons for founding it.
• Information Flow and Storage: This section contains diagrams, descrip-
tions and explanations of dSafe’s planned architecture and information flow.
The section also contains information regarding the nature of the information
they intend to store in their databases.
• Technical Challenges: This section contains a quick analysis of what tech-
nical challenges dSafe faces in its design and implementation. The challenges,
technical and otherwise, related to cloud technology are not covered until
Chapter 4.
3.1 The Company
dSafe is a company developing a secure digital safety deposit box for storing receipts
generated by credit card use, contracts or any other information that is suitable
for storage within banking information systems. The company originates from the
Entrepreneurship Center at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
and was started by Daro Navaratnam, the current Business Developer at dSafe.
The company was established in 2009, with the goal of creating an online, secure
and centralised storage for retail receipts – simplifying the process of warranty
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claims and other purchase annulations or refunds. To achieve this, cooperation
and integration with retail stores are essential. Partnership with large department
chains, focusing on expensive goods with extended warranty time, will be the pri-
mary focus in early stages of the business plan execution. By the end 2010, dSafe
aims to be fully integrated with 1000 retail stores before launching the product
officially. dSafe has already acquired partners within the sports industry, and in-
tends to bring in electronic and grocery chains. By the end of 2011, the aim is to
become fully integrated with current web-based banking solutions and to provide
the receipt storage through existing internet banking interfaces.
dSafe is now comprised of 5 employees, 3 full-time and 2 part-time, whereof 4
are programmers. All employees have technical academic backgrounds from the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
3.1.1 Business Plan
Navaratnam has developed a plan for dSafe’s progress. Figure 3.1 shows an overview
of the planned implementation of the software assets realising the business concept.
The Gantt diagram has not been translated to avoid any informational loss during
the transformation1.
Problem
Most consumers receive a paper receipt when purchasing goods, but the organisa-
tion and storage of all receipts are comprehensive tasks. Therefore paper receipts
are easily lost. This can be a problem, since the onus of proof lies on the consumer
side of the purchase when returning or claiming a refund of goods. dSafe claims
that over 52% of the consumers have experienced lack of service and difficulties
associated with making a claim when failing to present a valid receipt. A receipt
is needed in the following cases:
• Return and reclaim of goods (at most 5 years after purchase).
• Proof of purchase in insurance claims.
• Refund of travel expenses.
• The Norwegian Accounting Act states that receipts posted in the accounts
must be stored for at least 10 years.
Solution
The service dKvittering (dReceipt) will make sure that all consumer receipts are
automatically sent from the store to the dSafe storage, where the consumer will
have access to all receipts online through the dSafe consumer portal or via an
internet banking service. The consumer will be identified through the bank card
used for the transaction. dKvittering can also provide services such as:
1Readers are referred to Google Translate.
40
CHAPTER 3. CASE OVERVIEW 3.2. INFORMATION FLOW AND STORAGE
• Warnings to consumers that has purchased goods later identified as hazardous
or goods being recalled by the producer.
• An automatic overview of personal expenses and economy.
• Electronic supplements and vouchers for accounting.
• Easier and more accurate keeping of travel expenses.
3.1.2 Market
Web based banking solutions and electronic payments are popular among Norwe-
gian consumers as internet has grown to become accessible by the majority of the
population. During the first phase dSafe will implement the receipt storage service
for expensive luxury goods, such as sporting goods, electronics and furniture. In
Norway, these business segments are represented through large chains which makes
it easier to implement a solution towards an array of stores. The international
market is harder to predict, since a Danish company released a similar solution,
called ekvittering.dk in April of 2009. Also, a start-up company in Sweden is work-
ing towards offering digital receipts as a service. The market potential in Norway
alone is estimated to approximately 1 million users, based on the amount of people
already using electronic payment services.
3.1.3 Business Model
Since the burden of proof lies on the consumer when purchasing a commodity,
the consumers will have the greatest need for such a service. The market analysis
shows that most people are willing to pay approximately 15 to 20 NOK per month
to avoid having to store and organise paper receipts. dSafe will also profit on
selling market statistics. To enter this market quickly, dSafe can cooperate with
other businesses, e.g. Norstat, already present in this segment.
3.2 Information Flow and Storage
In order to locate any weaknesses one must identify the information which is pro-
tected by the software. This section will describe the information flow of the dSafe
information system and what information is persisted in the system. Local laws,
regulations and norms will also be taken under consideration when auditing the
information.
3.2.1 The data flow
dSafe’s current plans for their architecture is depicted in Figure 3.2. It contains a
number of components:
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Figure 3.1: Gantt-diagram over dSafe activities
• Two web services: One for stores uploading receipts and one for users to
access their data.
• One processing application: This performs parsing and storage.
• Two databases: One for customer data and a separate one for receipt data.
• Two raw storage devices: One for queued receipts and one where said receipts
are stored post processing.
The main data flow of the system is described below. Only the correct operational
pattern is included, although Figure 3.2 contains components that pertain to what
happens when certain operations fail.
1. A partner retail store consults a web service to find out whether or not the
credit card being used is associated with one of dSafe’s users.
2. If this is found to be the case, the store sends receipt data to another web
service over a secure, authenticated connection.
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Figure 3.2: Top level Data Flow Diagram
3. The web service generates a hash of the file, does a check to see if the hash is
unique in a dictionary. If the hash is unique, the incoming data is added to
a blob storage container named Queued Reciepts, and a pointer to the file
is added to a queue named Receipt Queue.
4. An application polls from the Receipt Queue. It fetches the correspond-
ing data from the Receipt Queue Storage and sends it to a corresponding
parser module.
5. The parser module reads data from the raw receipt data and returns a receipt
object (Data Transfer Object (DTO)) with all the data that is going to be
stored in the database.
6. The module sends the DTO to an Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) that
in turn inserts the receipt data in the receipt database.
7. The worker role copies the original receipt data from Receipt Queue Storage
to a separate blob storage named Original Receipt Storage.
8. Finally the worker role copies the original receipt data from Rececipt Queue
Storage to a separate Azure Blob Storage container named Original Receipt
Storage.
3.2.2 Persisted storage
From the definitions in Section 2 of the Norwegian Personal Data Act[44]:
1) personal data: any information and assessments that may be linked
to a natural person
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Figure 3.3: ER diagram of dSafe’s databases
8) sensitive personal data: information relating to a) racial or ethnic
origin, or political opinions, philosophical or religious beliefs,
b) the fact that a person has been suspected of, charged with, indicted
for or convicted of a criminal act,
c) health,
d) sex life,
e) trade-union membership.
dSafe intends to store:
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1. Receipts, which includes data on the specifics of each purchase.
2. Categorisation of receipt contents and customisable reports.
3. Contracts and their digital signatures (planned feature).
The detailed receipts of individuals tells a tale of behavioral patterns, revealing both
movement and shopping patterns. This could be very useful information to both
advertisers and criminals. E.g. identity thefts are mostly financially motivated and
the receipt data provide an excellent way to locate wealthy victims [45].
All of the information dSafe intends to store is clearly personal information as
it pertains to persons (satisfying Section 2 definition point 1 in said act), and
we argue that both receipts and contracts may contain information that can be
regarded as sensitive. For instance, receipts could come from sex shops (point 8d)
or pharmacies (point 8c).
3.3 Technical Challenges
The legal challenges previously described imply several technical challenges. Ac-
cording to Figure 3.2 there are two external entry points. In this section, the web
service that is to be used by the stores is referred to as E1 (External 1 ) and the
one that is to be used by end-users as E2 (External 2 ).
3.3.1 Confidentiality
The confidentiality of the data passed between dSafe’s services and client applica-
tions must be protected to prevent information from falling into malicious hands.
The integrity of the receipt data is paramount, as digital receipts are not only in-
tended as a convenience but also as proofs-of-purchase for warranty and insurance
claims. Using SSL to encrypt messages is a long standing best practice in the se-
curity community and is described in the security pattern Secure Pipe[46, chap. 9]
and as such, it is a good solution to this problem. dSafe intends to implement this
pattern in both external entry points.
3.3.2 Identification and Authentication
For both external entry points, the interacting entity, be it end-users or stores, must
be properly identified and authenticated to prevent untoward information disclo-
sure. dSafe intends to employ username and password credentials over an SSL
secured connection to achieve these properties. If, in this rudimentary authenti-
cation scheme, it could be guaranteed that these credentials are never transferred
unsecured, this identification scheme could suffice. Thus, dSafe would be able to
maintain which store uploads which receipts. However, since this upload operation
is very important to all involved it might be more appropriate to use some more
elaborate and more reliable authentication service.
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3.3.3 Non-repudiation
In E1, the stores upload receipt data. The web service will need to enforce non-
repudiation, so that stores are unable to deny that a receipt upload has taken place.
Otherwise, the digital receipt can never become equivalent to the paper version.
This will ensure that the users can trust dSafe’s service enough to discard paper
receipts, thus achieving the goal of furthering the “paperless society”.
On the other hand: To protect stores the service will need to provide at most
one-atomicity so that receipts are never duplicated in the database. As can be
observed in Figure 3.2, the service will hash received data and check for duplicates.
The hash algorithm will ensure that identical receipts are ignored.
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Chapter 4
Case Study
In this chapter we will discuss how dSafe’s application can be deployed securely in
a cloud. To be able to recommend an approach for cloud deployment, a defined
process is followed in order to identify the most valid risk scenarios for the deployed
assets. The process was defined in Section 1.2.
This chapter contains the following sections:
• Analysing the Cloud Provider Risk: In which we analyse the architec-
tural designs of dSafe that were presented in Chapter 3. We identify the
different assets of dSafe’s system and evaluate the risks related to putting
each of them into the care of a cloud provider.
• Deployment Model Acceptance: This section covers what deployment
model dSafe should use to meet both business-related functional requirements
and to facilitate the mitigation of risks previously identified.
• The Twelve Domains of Critical Focus: The Cloud Security Alliance
describes these domains in detail. In this section we put them into dSafe’s
context and make concrete recommendations as to how dSafe should handle
the many decisions prompted by the domains.
• Risk Mitigation: In this section mitigations are extracted from the discus-
sion involving the twelve domains. The section details the reasoning for each
domain and summarise the capabilities of respectively Microsoft, Amazon
and Google.
4.1 Analysing the Risk
This section is dedicated to identifying the assets of the dSafe application, evalu-
ating the associated risks and finding mitigation strategies. We utilise the Cloud
Security Guidance framework provided by the CSA which is meant for companies
considering the possibilities of moving their applications into the cloud. It provides
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a risk-based approach, but the process is not in any way intended to fully replace a
complete risk assessment methodology, nor is it meant to map all security require-
ments – it is used to evaluate assets’ tolerance for being moved into the cloud [3].
In other words, we are evaluating cloud provider risk – not any risks present due
to programmatic errors or malpractices, or even design level security flaws.
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the word asset thusly: “an item of prop-
erty owned by a person or company, regarded as having value and available to meet
debts, commitments, or legacies”. In our context assets are typically databases and
web services; items that need protecting – items that are critical for the applica-
tion and the company. For each of these assets we examine the relevant scenarios
that might occur in production, ascertaining the implied consequences. By taking
another look at the available cloud provider technologies we try to discover which
providers have implemented technologies for mitigating the charted risks. Thus,
conclusions on which provider is best suited for dSafe can be reached.
4.1.1 Identifying the Asset for Cloud Deployment
To assess the deployment of the dSafe application to the cloud, one must first
identify the assets. The security guidance suggests splitting the assets into two
categories:
1. Data
2. Applications/Functions/Processes
These assets should be evaluated separately, identifying which parts are moved
to the cloud. Scope creep should also be accounted for, since data and transac-
tion volumes often are higher than expected. One must therefore, in addition to
identifying what data and functions should reside on the cloud, take into account
future use of the data and functions. These assets are categorised in the scope creep
domain.
Data assets
Databases and other storage of vital data is covered in this section. Table 4.1 lists
the identified data assets. Each logical separation of an amount of related data is
called an asset. For structuring and ease of localisation, each asset is categorised
in a domain, in this case related to the type of storage. Each asset is assigned an
ID for later references.
Process assets
Transactions, processes and available functionality of the application falls under the
process asset category. E.g. worker roles and web services are both process assets.
These assets are different in nature, or work on data sets of dissimilar nature. The
process assets are listed in Table 4.2 and like the data assets, each process asset
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Table 4.1: Table shows all identified data assets with descriptions.
ID Domain Asset Description
DA1 Database End-user data Contains all information nec-
essary to achieve billing for
dSafe’s rendered services.
DA2 Database Receipt breakdown data Contains the normalised data
gathered from uploaded re-
ceipts.
DA3 Unstructured Pre-processing storage Raw receipt data uploaded
by dSafe’s partners.
DA4 Unstructured Post-processing storage Backup storage of the unpro-
cessed receipts.
DA5 Unstructured Failed receipt storage Storage of receipts which
syntax is unrecognisable
DA6 Queue Receipt pointer queue Contains pointers to receipts
in DA3.
DA7 Scope creep Contract storage Contains contracts and sig-
natures
is assigned a unique ID for easier referencing. Each asset is also placed under a
domain – related to the nature of the work being done or service offered.
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Table 4.2: Table shows all identified process assets with descriptions.
ID Domain Asset Description
PA1 Web service Receipt upload service Through which receipts are
uploaded (to DA3) for pro-
cessing (PA3) and storage
(DA4).
PA2 Web service Data retrieval service Through which users’ data
can be retrieved (from DA2)
for presentation.
PA3 Batch process Receipt parser Receipts are parsed, pro-
cessed and stored in database
DA1 for later retrieval.
PA4 Web service User verification service Through which stores can
find out whether a customer
is a dSafe user.
PA5 Scope creep Contract signer Uses secure signature to sign
legally binding documents.
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4.1.2 Evaluating the Asset
To prioritize and evaluate which assets have the greatest risk a set of questions are
to be answered for each of them. The risk is determined by defining a probability
and consequence to each of the scenarios for each asset. The quantifiers for these
factors are low (L), medium (M) and high (H). Figure 4.1 shows the multiplication
table for determining the risk. Table 4.3 shows an overview of all data assets and
the risk of each scenario applied to the asset. Table 4.4 shows the scenarios applied
to all process assets.
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Figure 4.1: A risk multiplication matrix that shows risk – annotated by low,
medium, high, in the middle of the matrix – being determined by probability and
consequence.
The questions to be answered for each asset make up scenarios for each of them:
SC1. How would we be harmed if the asset became widely public and
widely distributed?
For a data asset, this would mean that anyone can access the data store
and read the data. For a process asset, this means that anyone may use
the functionality provided by the process, e.g. calling a web service without
needing to bypass any authentication. Everyone, affiliated with dSafe or not,
would be able to obtain this information and use any functionality without
making an extraordinary effort.
SC2. How would we be harmed if an employee of our cloud provider
accessed the asset?
Accessing the asset means reading data from a data asset or using function-
ality provided by a process asset – the same as the previous question, but
restricted to an employee of the cloud provider. An employee of the cloud
provider is different from a non-affiliated person due to the fact that the
employee might have access to some elevated cloud instance privileges.
SC3. How would we be harmed if the process or function were manip-
ulated by an outsider?
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Even though this scenario implies process, the scenario is also valid for the
data assets. Manipulated means that the data is changed to another state.
For processes, manipulated means that the functionality is changed – the
process behaves in another way than normally expected.
SC4. How would we be harmed if the process or function failed to pro-
vide expected results?
For a process asset this would mean failing to show correct behaviour, expos-
ing incorrect interfaces, manipulating output or input, retrieving incorrect
data etc. This scenario is the equivalent to SC5 for data assets.
SC5. How would we be harmed if the information/data were unexpect-
edly changed?
For a data asset this would mean failing to keep the integrity of the data
over a period of time. This could lead to the later retrieval of incorrect data
or the loss of data. This scenario is the equivalent to SC4 for process assets.
SC6. How would we be harmed if the asset were unavailable for a period
of time?
This scenario implies that no operation could be done on a data asset. This
includes saves, retrievals, data operations or administrative operations. For
a process asset this would mean that the process could not be initiated, and
no functions would be operational.
For each of the assets identified we now reason about each scenario, determin-
ing their probability and consequence. This is combined to become the resulting
[L×H = M ]. In this example the probability is low, consequence high and resulting
risk medium.
DA1: End-user information
This database contains the tables described in the top part of Figure 3.3. This
database will hold data related to the users of dSafe’s services. dSafe will not store
usernames and passwords, instead choosing to utilise some sort of unified electronic
identity framework. As with the other databases in the system dSafe’s design hides
their locations and protects them with access control systems.
SC1. dSafe’s choice of using an external electronic identity provider greatly mit-
igates the consequences of exposure. Unless the external database is also exposed
the only connection an outsider might find to the user is an email address. In addi-
tion, the database contains users’ categorisations of rececipts and items contained
within; non-critical data. The actual receipts and their broken down data are not
contained within this database so the consequence is low. [L×L = L]
SC2. Unless the occurrence is publicly broadcasted there will be no loss of trust
between the users and dSafe. However, dSafe would have to consider whether this
breach of trust and/or contract on the part of the cloud provider is reason enough
for sanctions such as discontinuing the contract. [L×L = L]
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SC3. If the database content were to be altered the worst case is that users might
get access to other users’ data. Users’ categorisation schemes might also be broken.
In any case, no receipt data could be lost or manipulated as a direct consequence.
[L×M = L]
SC5. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. No loss of data would occur and stores would still be able to upload new
data. Users would not be able to access their data during the time period which
would understandably cause irritation of varying degrees. [L×L = L]
DA2: Receipt Breakdown Information
This database will contain the information parsed from the uploaded receipts.
These can be very detailed and actually detail exactly which merchandise the end-
user has purchased down to the brand of diaper for their kids. It is important to
note that this information is close to useless unless database DA1 also has been
compromised due to the clear separation of data in dSafe’s design. If DA1 were to
be compromised, the public would have access to a complete run-down on every
purchase end-users complete with their credit cards. If criminals were to use this
information to target the end-user as a burglary target this could cause dSafe to
be implicated as criminally negligent.
SC1. The primary consequence of this happening will be loss of trust between
dSafe and their users since the information is useless to both nosy neighbours and
criminals due to the proper data separation described in the last paragraph. The
probability of this occurrence is equally low due to the fact that the database’s
location will not be publicly exposed. [L×L = L]
SC2. Equivalent to DA1 SC2.
SC3. This occurrence could have far-reaching consequences. Not only will it
severely undermine the trust between the users and dSafe, but unless the work
of the manipulator is discovered and the changes reverted either party (users and
stores) could lose money. Due to the storage of original data, a change of this data
will not be critical. [L×M = L]
SC5. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. If this database could not be reached we effectively have a denial of service-
situation on our hands. [L×H = M ]
DA3: Unprocessed Receipts
This storage will contain raw receipts in differing formats until such time as the
process PA3 gets around to retrieving, parsing and moving them to their final
resting place, namely DA4.
SC1. It is unlikely that the end-users will see any distinction between having
this temporary storage exposed in contrast with the normalised broken down data
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from data asset DA2 and they would be right. This information is equally useless
however, unless both DA4 and DA1 are also exposed. Thus, we come back to
end-users not trusting dSafe to keep their data safe. [L×L = L]
SC2. Equivalent to SC2 for asset DA1.
SC3. This storage is intended to be kept in synchronisation with DA5 continuously.
This means that it is quite simple to detect that raw receipts are deleted. However,
there is no way to come back from this. At this point in the data flow this is the
only place the receipts’ data is stored. [L×H = M ]
SC5. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. This would effectively prevent new receipt queuings, but there wouldn’t be
any loss of existing data due to the downtime. [L×H = M ]
DA4: Original Receipt Storage
This unstructured storage is intended to contain all receipts as they were trans-
mitted from stores after they have been processed. This could potentially contain
more information than dSafe mines from it, for example a partial bank account
number.
SC1. The fact that this storage might contain more information than dSafe mines
from it would result in higher consequences than for the receipt database (DA2).
The probability is still low due to dSafe’s design. [L×M = L]
SC2. Equivalent to DA1 SC2.
SC3. If this data were to be altered this can be detected by comparing with the
hashed value stored in the receipt database. There is no way to recover deleted
or altered files though. The consequence is still low, since the parsed data is still
contained in DA2. [L×L = L]
SC5. This data is not meant to be consulted very often. It is merely a backup
database, so it is plausible that it would not be detected unless DA2 suffered a
cataclysmic failure. [L×M = L]
SC6. Raw receipts could then not be moved here from pre-processing storage, thus
disabling process PA3 from fulfilling its mandate of processing receipts. This would
halt the system that is concerned with incoming data. The system is intended to
recieve and process alot of data, so depending on how long this asset is unavailable
the consequences could become dire. [L×H = M ]
DA5: Failed Receipt Storage
This storage is for receipts that fail to meet process PA3’s format expectations.
These are stored for manual inspection.
SC1. Equivalent to DA4 SC1.
SC2. Equivalent to DA4 SC2.
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SC3. Receipts end up here if they do not fit one of the pre-defined schemes recog-
nisable by process PA3. If outsiders manipulate receipts after they have already
been rejected we suggest that they have not achieved anything. However, if the
outsider continously deletes receipts before the failed receipts are discovered these
could be lost. [L×H = M ]
SC5. Equivivalent to SC3.
SC6. This would prevent process PA3 in storing receipts that did not match the
recognisable schemes. This would entail that the receipts pile up in queue DA6 but
are not lost. [L×L = L]
DA6: Receipt Pointer Queue
This queue contains pointers into storage DA4.
SC1. This data consisting only of relative pointers to files is only useful to process
PA3. [L×L = L]
SC2. As with any other asset dSafe would have to decide whether to take action
against the provider. [L×L = L]
SC3. This could prevent process PA3 from processing receipts so the consequence
is dire. [L×H = M ]
SC5. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. Equivalent to DA3 SC6.
DA7: Contract Storage
This storage unit is part of the planned scope creep.
SC1. These contracts may contain information declared as sensitive information as
defined by Norwegian law. The contracts could also contain business information
vital to the survival of companies. This scenario could then have dire consequences
for both private persons and businesses. dSafe would be liable if this were to
happen. As with other data assets, the unintended disclosure of this content will
cause users to distrust dSafe. The probability of exposure must be said to be equal
to that of this scenario with the other databases. [L×H = M ]
SC2. Equivalent to DA1 SC2.
SC3. If legally binding contracts were to be altered or deleted, this can have dire
consequences for the parties involved in the contract. One can only speculate on
the specifics of this occurrence since we do not know what types of contracts may
be stored. [L×H = M ]
SC5. For instance, signatures may be removed or corrupted. This would make the
data untrustworthy since dSafe needs to guarantee non-repudiation. [L×H = M ]
SC6. No data would be lost, but service PA5 would be unable to provide neither
the signing service nor the contract upload service. Contrary to storage DA3, DA4
and DA5, this storage will see alot less data and action. [L×M = L]
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PA1: Receipt Upload Service
This asset is the entry point (previously described as E1 in Section 3.3) for all
businesses and partnering vendors. The service will move incoming receipts into a
queue for further processing.
SC1. The asset is protected from unauthorised access through basic authentication
over SSL (further described in Section 3.3.2). If this authentication is broken, a
peer may inject counterfeit receipts, opening for possibilities to take advantage
of this proof of purchase – even though this item is not actually purchased. A
breach of security of this web service may also open for more conventional attacks,
denying other users the service or corrupting application-internal data. As this web
service, in many ways, is the entry point to the application – and must be exposed
on the Internet in order to serve external stores and shops – a fair chance exists
that this may be the subject of attack from parties with malicious intent. Such an
attack would be disastrous for the integrity of the application and business idea.
[M×H = H]
SC2. If an employee of the cloud provider bypasses the authentication of the
web service, this may entail two scenarios. One; the employee takes advantage of
the service security breach and injects counterfeit receipts into the system to take
advantage of the trust between the store and dSafe application for the benefit of
the employee, or a third party. Two; the breach gets publicly known and the trust
between stores and dSafe gets critically weakened due to the fact that injecting
false data is now possible. [L×M = L]
SC3. In addition to the similarities this scenario shares with scenario SC1, a
manipulation of this service could lead to corrupting or mining of other users
incoming receipt data. If an outsider were to manipulate an incoming message,
he could also change the data to be stored to the original receipt storage and other,
deeper, security measures. The only way to prove the integrity of the data, if
questioned, is to compare it with the stores’ transmission logs. [L×H = M ]
SC4. The expected result of this web service is that it should put the raw receipt
in an unstructured storage container and a pointer to this receipt into the receipt
queue. If the web service fails to store the pointer, the receipt will not be processed
and will only be discovered by some sweep of the storage container. If the file itself
is not stored, a later process will discover this as a read is performed on the queue.
In the case that neither file nor pointer is forwarded to the correct service, the
receipt will be lost. If the web service fails to extract the receipt from the incoming
message, or does not receive a receipt properly this is a repudiation issue, that
must be solved together with the sender – the store. [L×H = M ]
SC6. If the web service is unavailable, no incoming receipts are recorded. The
burden of ensuring full logging of all purchases is therefore also in the hands of the
sender. Serious programmatic errors, cloud service downtime and other network
related availability issues may lead to this scenario – at least for a short period of
time. [M×H = H]
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PA2: Data Retrieval Service
The web service from which web portals, banking solutions or other third party
solutions may fetch data for presentation. The consumer must authenticate against
this interface with some kind of electronic ID. The service produces receipt history,
-details and user data from the underlying data stores.
SC1. The whole meaning of this service is that it should be publicly available. The
confidentiality of the data relies upon some authorisation. If the asset is publicly
exposed in the sense that the authorisation rules are bypassed, consumers with
malicious intentions may get hold of the private data of other users. [M×M = M ]
SC2. Equivalent to SC1.
SC3. Equivalent to SC1.
SC4. The expected result of the process is to produce receipt data from underlying
data stores and pass these to the web UI. If this web service fails to do so, it would
mean that users can not find their receipts and will not be able to make guarantee
or insurance claims on the purchased item. This would undoubtedly lead to trust
issues between the user and the dSafe service. [L×M = L]
SC6. Equivalent to SC4.
PA3: Receipt Parser
The worker process converts raw, incoming receipts to a dSafe-formatted nor-
malised receipt. It also stores raw receipt files into a original receipt storage. The
normalised receipt is stored and sent to another process for further work.
SC1. Making the receipt parser available would give external parties insight in
the formatting of the raw receipts and how they are parsed. It could reveal any
programmatic weaknesses that could be exploited in a directed DoS-attack, but
this does not seem very likely. [L×L = L]
SC2. Equivalent to SC1.
SC3. If manipulated, the output of the receipt parser could be altered, cascading
an incorrect receipt into the normalised receipt-storage. Also, changes could be
made in the original receipt-storage, which would make the discrepancy difficult to
discover. [L×H = M ]
SC4. Expected results from this process are either normalised receipts being sent to
storage and further processing, or the raw receipt being sent to the original receipt-
storage. Unexpected results could be different information in the data outputs,
between raw and processed receipts, the loss of either output, or the incorrect
interpretation of input format or validity of raw receipts. [M×L = L]
SC6. If unavailable, receipts would stack up in the queue. This would lead to
a delay in the receipt storage and further processing, and failed receipt handling.
[M×L = L]
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PA4: User Verification Service
This is a web service for allowing the stores to check whether a credit card is owned
by a user of the dSafe application before sending the receipt to dSafe.
SC1. If the asset were to become available for all to use, the only information
available would be whether or not a card number is owned by a user in the dSafe
system. This can be exploited to check whether a credit card is valid. [L×M = L]
SC2. An employee of the cloud service could check whether a credit card belongs
to a user, or to check if the credit card is valid at all. [L×M = L]
SC3. If an outsider could alter the web service, he/she could allow unwanted credit
cards to be accepted as valid or make the service reject all valid request, telling the
store not to send valid receipts. [L×M = L]
SC4. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. An absence of this service would mean that no receipts are sent to the
application, leaving a set of purchases without electronic proof of purchase. [L×L =
L]
PA5: Contract Signing Service
This is the future module for signing contracts and other legally binding docu-
ments through the web interface. It should also be responsible for storing these
documents, making them available to the correct users.
SC1. To sign a contract, one will need a high level security electronic signature,
legally associated to a person. Without such a signature, the algorithm for signing
the document should not be able to write a legally valid signature on the document.
[L×L = L]
SC2. To sign a contract, one will need a high level security electronic signature,
legally associated to a person. Without such a signature, the algorithm for signing
the document should not be able to write a legally valid signature on the document.
Even though an employee could actually get a hold of the code behind the executing
signer, this should not affect the validity of the documents signed. [L×L = L]
SC3. One could have manipulated the function to sign a document with an invalid
or no signature. This could lead the other party to believe that the document was
signed. One could easily discover such a discrepancy. [L×M = L]
SC4. Equivalent to SC3.
SC6. If the asset were unavailable, one could not sign or retrieve signed documents.
This would make the whole signing/contract-service unavailable for the period of
time, but the signing or retrieval process could be resumed. [L×L = L]
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Table 4.3: This table summarises the probabilities,
consequences and resulting risk values for the data as-
sets for each scenario.
Scenario Probability Consequence Risk
Asset DA1 - End User Information
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L M L
SC5 L M L
SC6 L L L
Asset DA2 - Receipt Breakdown Information
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L M L
SC5 L H M
SC6 L H M
Asset DA3 - Unprocessed Receipts
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L H M
SC5 L H M
SC6 L H M
Asset DA4 - Original Receipt Storage
SC1 L M L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L L L
SC5 L M L
SC6 L H M
SC1 – Widely published
SC2 – Employee gains access
SC3 – Manipulated by outsider
SC5 – Data changed
SC6 – Asset unavailable
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Table 4.3: This table summarises the probabilities,
consequences and resulting risk values for the data as-
sets for each scenario. (continued)
Scenario Probability Consequence Risk
Asset DA6 - Receipt Pointer Queue
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L H M
SC5 L H M
SC6 L H M
Asset DA7 - Contract Storage
SC1 L H M
SC2 L L L
SC3 L H M
SC5 L H M
SC6 L M L
Asset DA5 - Failed Receipt Storage
SC1 L M L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L H M
SC5 L H M
SC6 L L L
SC1 – Widely published
SC2 – Employee gains access
SC3 – Manipulated by outsider
SC5 – Data changed
SC6 – Asset unavailable
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Table 4.4: This table summarises the probabilities,
consequences and resulting risk values for the process
assets for each scenario.
Scenario Probability Consequence Risk
Asset PA1 - Receipt Upload Service
SC1 M H H
SC2 L M L
SC3 L H M
SC4 L H M
SC6 M H H
Asset PA2 - Data Retrieval Service
SC1 M M M
SC2 M M M
SC3 M M M
SC4 L M L
SC6 L M L
Asset PA3 - Receipt Parser
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L H M
SC4 M L L
SC6 M L L
SC1 – Widely published
SC2 – Employee gains access
SC3 – Manipulated by outsider
SC4 – Yields unexpected results
SC6 – Asset unavailable
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Table 4.4: This table summarises the probabilities,
consequences and resulting risk values for the process
assets for each scenario. (continued)
Scenario Probability Consequence Risk
Asset PA4 - User Verification Service
SC1 L M L
SC2 L M L
SC3 L M L
SC4 L M L
SC6 L L L
Asset PA5 - Contract Signing Service
SC1 L L L
SC2 L L L
SC3 L M L
SC4 L M L
SC6 L L L
SC1 – Widely published
SC2 – Employee gains access
SC3 – Manipulated by outsider
SC4 – Yields unexpected results
SC6 – Asset unavailable
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Table 4.5: Listing of all assets with determinations as to which deployment models
are acceptable
Asset Public Private (in-
ternal)
Private (ex-
ternal)
Community Hybrid
DA1 ! ! ! ! !
DA2 ! ! ! ! !
DA3 ! ! ! ! !
DA4 ! ! ! ! !
DA5 ! ! ! ! !
DA6 ! ! ! ! !
DA7 ! ! ! ! !
PA1 ! !
PA2 ! !
PA3 ! ! ! ! !
PA4 ! !
PA5 ! ! ! ! !
4.2 Deployment Model Acceptance
Having evaluated the risks for each asset we now need to determine which deploy-
ment models dSafe is prepared to accept for them. In Section 2.2 these models
were described.
• Public: dSafe’s initial choice of using Windows Azure as their cloud provider
along with their rationale was stated in Section 3.2. Since Windows Azure is
a public cloud this implies that they have no problem with the public cloud.
Also, all assets fits into this model.
• Private (internal): This collides with dSafe’s intention to avoid hardware
and licensing costs as well as utilising the flexibility of the cloud and as such
it is unacceptable. In addition, the web services (PA1, PA2 and PA4) can
not be realised in this model.
• Private (external): This would give dSafe the benefits of hardware and
licensing cost avoidance, but since the web services necessarily need to be
exposed this model is inappropriate.
• Community: Even though dSafe could run on an inter-business community
cloud with their business partners, this model would not be suitable for the
current business model where users can access the information from outside
such a community.
• Hybrid: dSafe has stated that they intend to use only one provider for their
core services since the legal hurdles associated with one alone are non-trivial.
This model can accomodate the deployment of all assets.
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In Table 4.5 we summarise which deployment models have been deemed acceptable
to dSafe.
4.3 The Twelve Domains of Critical Focus
In this section we will examine twelve domains that are relevant for both cloud and
non-cloud systems (also shown in Figure 4.2):
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Figure 4.2: The twelve domains of critical focus
Governance domains:
1. Governance and risk management
2. Legal and electronic discovery
3. Compliance and audit
4. Information lifecycle management
5. Portability and interoperability
Operational domains:
6. Traditional security, business continuity and disaster recovery
7. Data center operations
8. Incident response, notification and remediation
9. Application security
10. Encryption and key management
11. Identity and access management
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12. Virtualization
See [3] for further details on each domain. We introduce each domain and put it
into the dSafe context. Each domain has important implications for dSafe that
are inherent when putting enterprise systems into the cloud and so we will make
recommendations in each of the these domains; recommendations aimed at making
dSafe’s application optimally secure.
4.3.1 Governance domains
The governance domains concern strategies and policy decisions regarding how to
minimise risk and create a secure system in the cloud. An overview of the domains
is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: An overview of the five governance domains.
4.3.1.1 Governance and Risk Management
The Cloud Computing evangelists has for years told us about the hardware savings
and the performance and flexibility gains achievable by moving services into the
cloud. Unfortunately, companies deciding to try it out are not able to take the
money and run. These monetary savings should be put into understanding and
mitigating the many risks associated with allowing a cloud provider to store and
manage your data. Governance and risk management is the ability to govern
and measure these risks. This is done through thorough risk assessments of the
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application and the provider. A number of areas should be explored for a full
understanding of the risks associated with migrating to the cloud.
Organizations should (. . . ) assure reasonable information security across
the information supply chain, encompassing providers and customers of
Cloud Computing services and their supporting third party vendors, in
any cloud deployment model. – Cloud Security Alliance
Not much information exists out there of previous experiences and stories of the
vendor meeting the customers’ demands with regards to supporting a risk assess-
ment directed towards the core processes of the vendor. As such a direct approach
would seem implausible, if not impossible, for a small customer such as dSafe,
the best way to look at how the vendor meets governance demands is to take
a look at what is actually published with regards to how data centers are run
and how the customer’s demands are met. This would mean the openness of any
security white papers, the concreteness of SLA, security process documentation,
published success stories from other, third-party, customers or from audits done by
respectable auditors with regards to established standards and certifications. Also,
business continuity plans, incident management, contract requirements and other
non-operational assets will be important to assess the complete risk of choosing a
cloud provider. These items and more are covered in the preceding sections.
Recommendations: To ensure the validity of choice when establishing a con-
tract with the cloud provider, dSafe should engage professionals for a review of
contracts, SLA, any legal precedence, compliance with local law, End-User License
Agreement (EULA) and terms of service in addition. A professional would be able
to do a qualified risk assessment on the basis of these documents, and together with
the following studies – both within governance- and operational domains, and the
dSafe architectural risk assessment – it should state whether the choice is valid.
4.3.1.2 Legal and Electronic Discovery
dSafe intends to store citizens’ personal data in another country. This has legal
implications that need to be addressed, related to Norwegian as well as interna-
tional law. The Norwegian Personal Data Act defines both regulatory and privacy
requirements that dSafe needs to take seriously and so we will present a discussion
on these requirements and make some recommendations in this section [44].
In Section 3.2.2 we detailed what types of information dSafe intends to store. The
implications of storing this information prompted dSafe to contact the Norwegian
Data Inspectorate to receive recommendations. The inspectorate’s mandate in-
cludes:
(. . . ) verifying that statutes and regulations which apply to the process-
ing of personal data are complied with, and that errors or deficiencies
are rectified. – datatilsynet.no
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However, dSafe are themselves responsible for making sure the relevant regulation
is followed. The letter contained in Appendix A was the response to that inquiry.
The relevant regulation is contained in the Personal Data Act. Section 8 of said
act states:
Personal data (. . . ) may only be processed if the data subject has con-
sented thereto, or there is statutory authority for such processing, or the
processing is necessary in order to fulfill a contract to which the data
subject is party, or to take steps at the request of the data subject prior
to entering into such a contract, (. . . )
The act also defines the processing of sensitive personal data in the same manner,
in Section 9, with the same provision for consent.
Section 13 clearly states that the security of the information must be maintained
with regards to confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility in the connection of
processing it. Simply put, this means that some sort of scheme must be employed
to ensure that:
• Persons not involved with the processing does not gain access to the infor-
mation.
• The data is not corrupted or changed en route.
• Persons given access are properly authorised.
Section 13 also states that the measures taken to ensure this, as well as the informa-
tion system itself, must be well documented and made available to the controller,
the data processor and the Data Inspectorate.
Section 15 has two clauses. The first being that data can not be manipulated in
any other way than has been established in writing with the customer. The other
being that data can not be turned over for storage or manipulation without such
agreement. This becomes pertinent especially because dSafe intends to outsource
storage to a cloud provider. The same agreement must include the measures that
were demanded in Section 13.
Section 19 states that whenever data is collected from the data subjects themselves,
the controller must inform the data subject of the identity of the controller, why
the data is collected, whether the data will be disclosed and if so, the identity of
the recipient and that supplying this data is voluntary.
While all these sections must be heeded, the Data Inspectorate emphasises Section
29 as dSafe’s biggest challenge. The Section primarily states:
Personal data may only be transferred to countries which ensure an ade-
quate level of protection of the data. Countries which have implemented
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data meet
the requirement as regards an adequate level of protection.
As with Section 15, this becomes pertinent due to dSafe’s intention of outsourcing
storage to a cloud provider. If the cloud provider then moves the data to another
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region which does not satisfy Section 29 has dSafe become in breach of Norwegian
law? Section 30 defines a loophole:
Personal data may also be transferred to countries which do not ensure
an adequate level of protection if the data subject has consented to the
transfer.
Here we again see that informed consent is very powerful. If this consent is attained
from dSafe’s users, then dSafe can be given considerable leeway in how the data
are maintained and processed. Even if this condition has not been met, the Data
Inspectorate may allow said transfer if dSafe provides adequate safeguards with
respect to the rights of the data subject.
However, leveraging this informed consent can turn out to be unnecessary if the
right cloud provider is chosen:
Microsoft must be able to comply with a myriad of regulatory obligations
because it has data centers in a number of countries and offers online
services to a global customer base. – Microsoft[29]
Microsoft’s Azure platform allows the setting of geolocalisation, which is the express
guarantee of data staying in specific data centers. This would allow dSafe to adhere
to the requirement of staying within the borders of a country that has implemented
EU Directive 95/46/EC and thereby Section 29 of the Personal Data Act. Amazon
also offers this feature under a different name whereas Google has no such feature.
For more information on these features consult Section 4.3.2.2.
Recommendations: dSafe will need to create a clear and readable EULA to
ensure a legally valid written consent is present. The EULA has to not only describe
the relationship between the user and dSafe, but also the third party cloud provider.
dSafe should aim to keep this as simple as possible by choosing this provider with
due care. We readily recommend that dSafe utilises a cloud provider that offers the
geolocalisation-feature as this will facilitate simpler conditions for the EULA. dSafe
will also need to implement as well as document all features that ensure the security
of all the information that flows through their systems to comply with Section 13
of the law. Refer to Section 4.3.1.3 for how best to achieve this compliance.
4.3.1.3 Compliance and Audit
In order to provide a meaningful EULA dSafe will have to get assurances from their
chosen cloud provider on how data will be managed. If external auditors were to
audit dSafe it is paramount that dSafe understands the capabilities of their chosen
provider. The provider might not be able to offer any sort of guarantees. This
could potentially be disruptive to certification processes and ultimately negatively
affect dSafe’s trustworthiness. The CSA mention several specific items dSafe must
understand:
• Regulatory applicability for the chosen provider.
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• The division of compliance responsibilities between dSafe and this provider.
• The cloud provider’s ability to provide evidence needed for compliance.
• How dSafe is responsible for bridging the gap between the auditor and the
provider.
ISO 27001 is becoming increasingly important and has been adopted by the ISO
Norway (Norsk Standard). Several Norwegian business exist that can assist and/or
certify dSafe as ISO 27001-compliant, e.g. Center Teknologisk institutt Sertifiser-
ing AS, Det Norske Veritas or Nemko. After contacting the Norwegian Data In-
spectorate we were informed that they view the ISO 27001 process favourably as
witnessed in this translated quote (Original correspondence in Appendix B):
We encourage using it [becoming ISO 27001 certified] if the company
deems it useful with regards to their size and other needs. It will surely
assist in implementing internal controls within the company with regards
to employee training, discrepancy handling and auditing. – Frank U.
Eriksen, The Norwegian Data Inspectorate
Recommendations: In addition to formalising dSafe’s information security poli-
cies this would have satisfied Section 13 of the Norwegian Personal Data Act (see
Section 4.3.1.2). dSafe intends to put the entire system into the cloud so they will
have to audit their chosen provider to ensure the correct management of data. This
may prove to be difficult and implausible. If dSafe were to use a cloud provider
that was ISO 27001 certified it would become easier for dSafe to bridge the gap
between their auditor and their provider alleviating the need for dSafe to pursue
an independent audit.
4.3.1.4 Information Lifecycle Management
dSafe intends to store and process large amounts of data, data that we have already
shown to be potentially sensitive. This domain is about maintaining control over
any and all data that flow through the systems. This becomes even more important
when moving data into the cloud where a provider has another agenda: improving
the bottom line for their shareholders.
The Cloud Security Alliance describes a version of Information Lifecycle Manage-
ment: The Data Security Lifecycle. The cycle consists of six stages: Create, Store,
Use, Share, Archive, Destroy. The CSA’s keywords are listed here:
1. Create: Classify and Assign Rights.
2. Store: Access Controls, Encryption, Rights Management, Content Discov-
ery.
3. Use: Activity Monitoring and Enforcement, Rights management, Logical
Controls, Application Security.
4. Share: Data Loss Prevention (DLP), Encryption, Logical controls, Applica-
tion Security.
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5. Archive: Encryption, Asset Management.
6. Destroy: Crypto-Shredding, Secure Deletion, Content Discovery.
In the lifecycle, nothing is left to chance. Every scenario pertaining to data pro-
cessing is covered.
We see that encryption is part of several of the steps in the cycle, but we will handle
that subject under the operational domain of Encryption and Key Management in
Section 4.3.2.5.
Recommendations: As the data moves from stage to stage in the Data Security
Lifecycle, dSafe should maintain strict control of the data. Unless proper data
security measures such as encryption and authentication are employed, dSafe will
not be guaranteed that the data can not be sniffed by outsiders. The chosen
provider should already have taken this into consideration by promoting the use of
encryption.
dSafe should always be in control of where their data are physically. We have al-
ready seen that both Amazon and Microsoft offers this guarantee through allowing
the express setting of data locality. This guarantee is essential due to the legal
implications described in Section 4.3.1.2.
Optimally, from purely a security point of view, the chosen provider should have
put into place facilities for offering encryption of data at rest in their storage units,
at file system level. None of the cloud providers we surveyed has such facilities at
the time or writing.
In cases where illegalities might have taken place in the data center, law enforce-
ment agencies might target hardware in trying to get the data contained within.
dSafe should ascertain assurances that their data is not seized along with data
targeted by law enforcement agencies. This scenario could render dSafe’s services
unavailable merely because their services happened to be co-localised with another
company.
dSafe needs to develop plans for backup and recovery. Many cloud providers offer
a redundant storage solution that can guarantee the availability of dSafe’s data,
but dSafe will need to backup their data in case something unforeseen happens.
For example: dSafe rolls out a new version of a part of their system that has not
been sufficiently tested and the system starts losing data. No backup solution is
complete without a recovery plan such that their services can come back online
with correct data [47, Chapter 26]. In addition such a backup solution can help
dSafe if they decide to migrate to another provider in the future.
The final stage of the Data Security Lifecycle is also highly dependent on the chosen
cloud provider. When dSafe’s policies mandate the deletion of data, they must have
the provider’s assurances that this data is not retained anywhere outside their
control. In addition it is a well known fact that data on magnetic hard drives can
be recovered to some degree depending on the mode of deletion. Secure Deletion
implies that that data is made completely unrecoverable and dSafe will need to
ascertain this guarantee from their chosen provider.
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4.3.1.5 Portability and Interoperability
The business chooses a cloud provider and launches their services on the platform.
Somewhere down the line many things could happen that would cause the the
business to consider leaving this cloud provider. The CSA suggest several reasons
for why this might be favourable: increased costs, provider going out of business,
degradation in service quality or a dispute between business and vendor. Unless
this situation was planned for, this could become costly. This is a non-trivial
problem. The Cloud Security Alliance refers to this as basic business continuity
planning. In this section we will deal with potential measures for easing continuity
planning in a migratory setting. For the type of business continuity dealing with
disaster recovery see Section 4.3.2.1.
• Software-as-a-Service: When dSafe’s application is written to run like this
the CSA finds it plausible that we are talking about rewriting the application
for another provider. The focus should be to preserve or enhance the security
functionality of the application.
• Platform-as-a-Service: In this case the focus remains the same, but it
should be simpler since the application is more independent of the providers
services.
• Infrastructure-as-a-Service: When dSafe manages the platform them-
selves, they will only need to find another IaaS provider. Even this is non-
trivial as we will see next.
IaaS vendors utilise virtualisation technology. To ease migration it is important
to understand the format of the virtual machine instances dSafe would be running
on the current provider’s services. For example Amazon describes that they utilise
Xen Hypervisor1 heavily modified and extended [20]. These details could prove
disruptive if dSafe were to migrate the virtual machine away from AWS. The
issues of virtualisation will be further elaborated upon in Section 4.3.2.7.
Recommendations: What happens when dSafe can not find a new provider
that can accommodate their needs? dSafe should document and understand their
needs sufficiently to be able to identify this situation. This includes, among other
things, the sheer amount of data that needs to be migrated.
In Section 4.3.1.4 we recommended that dSafe pursued ISO 27001 certification.
To become certified dSafe would have to have documented every security control
thoroughly. If dSafe were to choose not to pursue this certification we here rec-
ommend that dSafe still document their architecture with focus on their security
controls sufficiently. This will, in part, facilitate a successful migration with no loss
of security.
The challenges of this domain depend to a large degree on which service model dSafe
is working on, but regardless dSafe will need to have in place backup and recovery
solutions to be able to successfully complete a migration. This was mentioned in
1See http://xen.org/
71
4.3. THE TWELVE DOMAINS OF CRITICAL FOCUS CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY
Section 4.3.1.4 but it is highly relevant here as well. Efficient backup and recovery
procedures are vital in achieving maximum business continuity.
Another good practice for maintaining a system that is convenient to migrate is
avoiding tying one’s applications to the provider’s proprietary APIs. A sound
architecture could include abstraction layers to achieve this, albeit it is not within
the scope of the current study to explore this field.
dSafe should commit itself to following as many open standards as possible. This
will further facilitate migration.
4.3.2 Operational Domain
Whereas the governance domain concern broad security strategies the operational
domains focuses on how to actually achieve the goals of these strategies. Hence we
will be more specific and focus on what dSafe should actually do to keep their data
secure in the cloud. An overview of the operational domains is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: An overview of the seven operational domains.
4.3.2.1 Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recov-
ery
When companies start venturing out into the cloud this area grows more complex.
dSafe might gain performance increases and cost savings by utilising the cloud,
but the risks become more dire. Business continuity is the science of maintaining
service functions on which businesses depend on. This is primarily about prevention
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techniques but disaster recovery is also part of it. Running several cloned services
on different hardware is a typical example of the first whereas having an effective
backup and recovery-solution is a good example of the latter. These issues becomes
paramount for cloud providers for the simple fact that most providers provide
subscription based pricing schemes; when services do not run the provider does not
get paid.
In Section 4.1.2 we described and interpreted the six different scenarios from CSA’s
Security Guidance [3] of which the second deals with the risk of a rogue insider.
We deem the probability to be low but it can be surprising what people will do
when they believe they can get away with it. Consequently, this is a scenario all
vendors bear in mind. In addition to audits and standardised verification, promises
regarding data center security are also made on behalf of each provider through
security whitepapers and articles. Little information was found on the policies of
Google and Microsoft, and the facts found were related to data centers – not specif-
ically AppEngine or Azure – so some assumptions are made in the above studies
of these. Amazon states that no customer instances can be reached by Amazon’s
administrators. This is reassuring, but with regards to the facts present about the
virtualisation technology run by other providers (see Section 2.4.10 for details), this
may – although not explicitly stated – be the case for multiple other providers. If
such facts were presented on behalf of the respective cloud technologies, this would
be a crucial detail in the cloud provider decision-making process.
In Section 2.4.1 we saw that every vendor uses redundancy and geographic dis-
persement to ensure the security of the customers’ data and applications. While
Amazon disperses the data across different data centers, we could not locate any
information on how the data is treated within the single data center. Microsoft,
however, is very open about its fault domains within each data center.
Recommendations: To limit the possibility of having provider employees tam-
pering with or gathering your data in the cloud, it is advisable to choose a cloud
provider with defined data center access routines, a process for distributing priv-
ileges to administrators and a process for selecting employees which are to have
physical access to the hardware where the data resides. These processes should
be verified by some internal third party audit2 and top-level routines publicly an-
nounced. All three cloud vendors have SAS 70 Type II verified data centers. This
fulfills, to some degree, the recommendation of verified processes. In addition, Mi-
crosoft is ISO 27001 certified, which is an additional international verification (see
Section 2.4.3 for further details). It is our opinion that dSafe should choose an ISO
27001 certified vendor so they would be able to look the vendor in the cards by
requesting insight into the certification process.
The fault domains of the Windows Azure platform, to us, look very promising
in ensuring both the security of the data and the continual availability of dSafe’s
services, making Azure look like a sound choice.
2An internal third-party audit is an external verification- or standardisation agency performing
audit on routines and processes on behalf of the organisation in question.
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4.3.2.2 Data Center Operations
To fully grasp the basic architectures and technological possibilities, the cloud
customer should understand how the provider implements The Essential Charac-
teristics of Cloud Computing – five characteristics demonstrating their relation to
and separating cloud computing from traditional computing. The reader is referred
to [3] for further descriptions of the characteristics.
On-demand self-service is the first characteristic. This is the ability to provide
auto-scaling of the compute and storage cloud depending on instance load. With
potential increasing traffic and little traffic history to draw conclusions from, it is
essential for dSafe to employ any auto-scaling capabilities available in or supported
by the cloud instance, as long as the costs associated are reasonable. This charac-
teristic also addresses the Rapid elasticity and Measured service characteristics.
As described in Section 2.4.6, the providers differ somewhat in the way that this is
handled. This is mostly due to the nature of the different clouds. AWS and Azure
provide API for administering instances, whilst Google does not provide a notion
of an instance at all. The solutions from Amazon and Windows are quite similar
and no major differences separate the two. With Google’s model, there is no need
to administer the scale of the instance, since this is completely transparent to the
user. From a technical perspective, dSafe is dependant on having a completely
scalable design to meet the possible increased load in the future. To ensure that
the hardware “leased” follow the meeting demand of processing, an API for the
statically defined instances is necessary. If the instance is transparent, or at least
dynamic, a comprehensive overview is needed – as the one provided by Google.
In a business perspective, dSafe would benefit from having full control over the
instances and therefore the cost model – although this is regarded as outside the
scope of this study.
Broad network access means to what degree is computational and storage capabilities
available from different platforms? As more and more internet services use XML-
based, standardised protocols – available over HTTP – the services become more
and more accessible from a host of different devices. Broad network access only
encompasses HTTP-based protocols, since all dSafe services are accessible through
web services, over HTTP or HTTPS. Both Windows Azure, Amazon Web Services
and Google AppEngine support RESTful services, SOAP and other XML-based
protocols and no relevant difference between the providers exist for this particular
characteristic.
Resource pooling means grouping together resources, e.g. storage, processing, mem-
ory, network bandwidth and virtual machines. A cloud provider may specify the
location of these resources for dSafe to be able to adhere to legal restraints (see
Section 4.3.1.2 for further details) on the data handled by the hosted application.
Even though no promises are made for data locality, one can in both Windows
Azure and Amazon Web Services define in which area the application should reside.
This is essential for dSafe, planning to host all data – including potentially sensitive
data – in the cloud. It seems that this locality mechanism is a strong selling point
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both for Microsoft and Amazon, so one could trust them to not move data outside
this defined area. Google does not offer dSafe a location-specific environment.
Recommendations: For the on-demand self-service cloud characteristic, the so-
lutions provided by each vendor is suitable for their cloud product model, although
to prevent unwanted scaling of the dSafe instance, following from a high load (e.g.
directed DoS), some control of the instance is preferable, provided by Microsoft and
Amazon through manual, user-defined instance scaling, and by Google through the
definition of an upper limit of cost for each application. In dSafe’s context, all these
three vendors would provide enough control of the instance.
With regards to the broad network access characteristic, all of the surveyed cloud
vendors provide support for all relevant dSafe-employed protocols. There is there-
fore no decisive difference between vendors regarding this characteristic.
How resources are being allocated is not really of interest to dSafe. The interesting
point is where dSafe’s own, potentially sensitive, data are being processed and
stored. Since all vendors should be trusted when it comes to efficient use of resource
pooling, some will spread the data over wast geographical areas, whilst other will
try to keep the data within a defined area. Both Microsoft and Amazon could be
trusted to host the data in specific locations. In dSafe’s context, Google does not
provide sufficient promises of data locality.
4.3.2.3 Incident Response, Notification and Remediation
The next challenge dSafe has to face is what to do when security incidents, data
breaches and such occur in the cloud. The CSA suggests augmenting existing
standards for security incident response, bringing up the standards to the current
reality where the responsibilities are shared between customer and cloud provider.
Introducing measures to ensure security into the software’s architecture plans from
the beginning is a relatively new tradition. Hence most older applications are not
prepared for being hosted off-site, much less designed for it. The usual challenges
of local data center operations are complicated further by the nature of the public
cloud: Co-tenancy with other the applications and data of other customers means
making sure your data is not accessible to them. These co-tenants can even be
malicious. In this section we will analyse the capabilities and strategies of the
different providers in this field.
The CSA recommends that cloud providers consider application layer logging to
avoid the clutter of mixing the log output for several customers’ applications. We
saw in Section 2.4.5 that every cloud vendor surveyed have implemented this and
how this could be leveraged through the use of Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) systems.
Recommendations: In dSafe’s current design documents, the designers have
not included incident analysis or prevention systems. Regardless of which platform
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dSafe chooses their developers should implement or even buy an existing SIEM
solution. Evaluating existing SIEM solutions falls outside the scope of this report
but what is relevant is that dSafe understands the cloud providers’ capabilities
within logging and diagnostics to enable sufficient data mining and the creation
of appropriate rulesets. In this section we have looked at the different logging
capabilities of cloud providers and it is clear that both Microsoft and Amazon
takes this very seriously, both publishing APIs to enable SIEM processes. For
further information on what SIEM is and the how and when to leverage SIEM
dSafe should consult [48].
4.3.2.4 Application Security
This domain is about deciding which service model is the most appropriate. The
CSA likens the security requirements of an application residing in the cloud with
the application residing in a DMZ. This in effect means designing defence into
every layer of the application and expecting the very worst malicious hackers can
throw at it. The domain covers security in the deployment phase, in the production
phase and also the decommissioning phase. The CSA divide the consequences of
cloud computing into five aspects:
• Application Security Architecture: The application in the cloud can
have a very dynamic relationship with various third party dependencies.
• Software Development Life Cycle: The idea of including security into
the software design process at the very beginning has steadily been gaining
traction over the last decades. The introduction of cloud computing makes
this even more important: Security implications can be severe and the “over-
head” of implementing the needed security may make project leaders think
again when considering cloud deployment.
• Compliance: The implementation of SIEM processes has very real conse-
quences for security. Implementation is affected by the simple fact the the
cloud system is a distributed system, creating a need for integrity and con-
fidentiality in the way logs and incident reports are retrieved and processed.
The nature of SIEM processes is discussed in Section 4.3.2.3.
• Tools and Services: Developing for the cloud might confer constraints on
software libraries and developer tools that are available to the customer. This
needs to be properly understood for the customer to be able to make proper
choices.
• Vulnerabilities: The distributed nature of applications in the cloud brings
with it new vulnerabilities related to communications between machines.
For IaaS where the customer creates their own virtual machines complete with
guest operating systems the normal hardening techniques for machines residing
in DMZs should be applied. AWS supplies all virtual machine instances with a
firewall with a default of Deny All. Microsoft does not provide virtual machines
with administrative access in the same way that Amazon does, going for a another
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approach. The web roles and worker roles of the Azure platform are designed to be
web services so only ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS)) are available. No other incoming ports can be opened to the outside
world. Applications running on Google’s PaaS platform do not need controllable
firewalls. The platform even locks down the use of sockets completely, only allowing
HTTP or HTTPS requests to other hosts.
The CSA makes the explicit recommendation of always encrypting network streams.
We will handle this subject under Encryption and Key Management, Section 4.3.2.5.
As another application security enhancing technique, the CSA recommends logging.
The implementation and usage of Security Information and Event Management was
discussed in Section 4.3.2.3.
Recommendations: dSafe should contractually make sure that they are allowed
to perform remote vulnerability assessments such as penetration testing on their
applications when they are deployed. Cloud providers may prove reluctant or hesi-
tant to allow this since it can be difficult to seperate these attacks from real attacks.
Nevertheless, it is extremely important that dSafe is able to do vulnerability as-
sessments on their production environment.
It is paramount that dSafe properly understands the security implications inherent
when designing an application for the cloud. The CSA emphasises three items
within the generalised software development life cycle that are affected by the
nature of the cloud:
1. Threat and Trust Models: Bringing in third party providers complicates
these models further. Earlier domains have explored this in further detail.
E.g. certifications and other audits can mitigate threats and build trust.
2. Application Assessment Tools: The different cloud providers have differ-
ent APIs that leverage their specific platform’s features as well as development
tools. We mentioned it in the domain of Interoperability that API abstraction
can be used to counteract this.
3. Software Development LifeCycle (SDLC) and Quality Assurance
(QA) Processes: For all intents and purposes, the public cloud is like the
DMZ. Hence, dSafe should protect every asset in their system as if they were
residing in a DMZ. This means that no assets should be accessible without
proper authenticated credentials. Identity and Access Management is covered
in Section 4.3.2.6.
4.3.2.5 Encryption and Key Management
We have described that dSafe intends to store personal data and potentially sen-
sitive personal data depending on the end-users. In Section 4.3.1.2 we saw that
Norwegian law demands that information is inaccessible to untoward people and
is protected in transit from both exposure and being altered. Encryption assists
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greatly in achieving compliance within these very important problems of confiden-
tiality and integrity. The three decisions that need to be made are: Should data
be encrypted while:
• In transit?
• At rest?
• On backup media?
Furthermore, the challenges of the management of encryption keys are non-trivial.
The CSA defines the following three areas of focus:
• Secure Key Stores: As with the data these keys are used to encrypt and
decrypt, the keys themselves needs to be protected to the same degree.
• Access to Key Stores: The access to the keys of course needs to be tightly
controlled to keep all data from being decrypted and stolen.
• Key Backup and Recoverability: While the intentional loss of an encryp-
tion key could be said to be the most effective secure deletion method, the
unintentional loss of an encryption key can cripple the company by rendering
their stored data effectively lost.
SSL will encrypt end-to-end-traffic within the application layer. This will make
it harder for attackers to get a hold of any authentication data transferred for
access to the service. SSL encryption is available on all cloud platforms, although
the requirements and implementation differ. On the Windows Azure platform
developers are able to upload SSL certificates through a web portal and associate
them with services they wish to provide. Every component in the AppFabric is
available as a web service. This certificate process itself is performed over an SSL
protected connection to prevent eavesdropping [49]. In addition, Microsoft enforces
the use of SSL whenever connecting to SQL Azure [50]. Amazon highly recommends
SSL connections for everything. Beyond this, Amazon does not provide facilities to
assist the client in implementing it. On Google’s AppEngine SSL must be enabled
for the Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) through which you wish to support
secure traffic. If the application is served outside a Google Apps domain, you must
direct all traffic though the application’s appspot domain.
None of the inspected cloud providers provide facilities for encrypting any data in
any of the surveyed data storage solutions. Microsoft’s SQL Server 2008 R2 solution
supports what they call Transparent Data Encryption3, but this functionality has
not made it into the cloud version. According to MSDN Magazine, however, it is
a feature being considered for future releases [51].
Recommendations: To satisfy Norwegian law dSafe should encrypt data while
in transit. SSL is a tried and true solution for this problem. We also recommend
that dSafe encrypts any data at rest and on backup media. This will effectively
mitigate the first and second scenario (See Section 4.1.2) which are about the
3See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb934049.aspx
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unintended disclosure of information. Unfortunately this will have to be imple-
mented on the application level since no provider supports this. Provided dSafe
chooses a proven algorithm and an appropriate key size the developers would also
have solved the Secure Deletion problem described in Section 4.3.1.4. The keys
themselves should not be kept in storage at the same provider since this would
counteract the mitigation. Whatever the developers of dSafe choose to do they
should in no circumstances use any keys provided by the cloud provider in their
own cryptographic functions for the obvious reason that the provider would then
have access to the information.
4.3.2.6 Identity and Access Management
Authentication is the process of identifying a peer before exchanging a piece of infor-
mation. Many different standards and implementation for authentication, and the
cloud providers seem to differ in their choice. If a standard is adopted by one of the
large financial services partnered with dSafe, and federated authentication were to
become available, this would be a deciding factor for mitigating any authentication
risks and usability issues associated with a decentralised authentication scheme.
As the BankID4 identification solution is becoming the de facto standard for bank-
ing Electronic ID (eID) in Norway [52], this – or a similar solution – would be
preferable in order to already take advantage of a wide spread distribution of key
generators and other items needed for a strong two-factor authentication. The se-
curity tiers, or levels, of Norwegian governmental eID solutions are defined by the
Framework for authentication and non-repudiation i electronic communication with
and in public sector [53], a framework published by the Ministry of Government
Administration, Reform and Church Affairs to aid governmental operations in the
process of securing collaboration in open or closed networks. We will also adhere
to this norm while defining eID security levels. The framework defines four levels
of security (translated from Norwegian):
Level 1 – No requirements on authentication:
Gives little or no security. Open solutions fall under this category. Some
solutions fall under this category because they are unable to meet the
requirements of level 2. Examples of solutions in this category are:
• Self-defined password and username online.
• Identification with Social Security Number (SSN).
Level 2 – One-factor authentication:
Extended requirements on authentication factor issuing, the security
of persisted authentication credentials, non-repudiation requirements.
Examples of solutions in this category are:
• Static password, generated and sent to a directory of residents-
registered (referred to as registered) address.
4See http://www.bankid.no
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• Password calculators without password protection, at least dis-
tributed to a registered address.
• Single-use password-list distributed to a registered address.
Level 3 – Two-factor, one dynamic:
Additional procedures for issuing the authentication credentials from
level 2, and more strict security of stored credentials. Same non-
repudiation requirements as for level 2 apply. Examples of solutions
in this category are:
• Password generators protected with a PIN-code, where the first
PIN is sent in a separate shipment.
• Single-use password sent to cellular phone, where the phone is
registered with a code sent to registered address.
• Person-Standard certificate security level defined in Requirements
specification for PKI for the public sector [54]. The reader is di-
rected to the specification for further details.
• Single-use password-lists used together with defined password and
username. The definition of the password should be done with the
use of a single-use code sent to registered address.
Level 4 – Two-factor, one dynamic:
According to current regulations, the solutions must be self-declared
in The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (NPT) in
relation to their fulfillment of the requirements defined by the Require-
ments specification for PKI for the public sector regarding the cat-
egories Person-High and Enterprise. Examples of technologies that
could meet the requirements of this security level are:
• Two-factor solution where one of the factors is dynamic, and where
one of the authentication factors or a registry process factor is
issued personally. A third party is used to register a log with the
mapping between the information, or any actions performed on
this, and the identity of the user. The log shall be stored with a
protection against modifications.
• Two-factor solution where one of the factors is dynamic, and where
one of the authentication factors or a registry process factor is is-
sued personally. Special software to ensure complete non-repudiation
of the logging and to hinder any operator modifications against
such logs.
Furthermore, the NPT define several levels of certificate security in the Require-
ments specification for PKI for the public sector. These levels are Person-High,
Person-Standard and Enterprise and is further described in the specification. So-
lutions that meet requirements for Person-High could satisfy the requirements for
level 4 in the framework.
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A level 4 accepted eID (with a qualified5 electronic signature) is also valid for level
3, 2 and 1; a level 3 accepted eID (with an advanced electronic signature) is a valid
level 2 and 1 eID etc. This means that if a level 2 eID is required to log into a
service, e.g. the dSafe receipt service, one can employ a level 4, 3 or 2 eID for this
purpose.
Several of the eID-issuers already on the market in Norway are both defined as
qualified and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based with a Person-High or En-
terprise security level. Examples of these are Buypass6, BankID and Commfides7.
Both Buypass and Commfides are regarded as level 4 solutions. BankID is by some
sources [55, 56] considered as level 4, but did not get accepted as a valid eID for
the governmental eID-portal ID-porten due to some issues with the lack of mes-
sage encryption [57, 58, 59]. A number of scandals imposed by the lack of secure
authentication, especially two-factor authentication, have been uncovered during
the last couple of years [60] and the Citizens Financial Bank8 even got sentenced
in 2007 due to neglecting a document [61] recommending two-factor authorisation
for banks.
The scope-creep defined in Section 4.1.1 encompasses the signing of documents
through the dSafe service. Since signing of documents is now introduced, this would
impose new security requirements beyond those that follow the receipt reading
service. The Norwegian E-Signature Law (ESL)[62] facilitate a secure and efficient
use of electronic signatures by defining requirements to qualified certificates, to
the issuers and to safe generation of these signatures. We do not see why any
of the level 4 candidates mentioned above could be used for electronic signatures
according to the ESL, as we have no experience as legal practitioners. BankID’s
signing capability approach has been legally reviewed and found valid [63]. All three
vendors are self-declared providers of legally valid electronic signatures [64, 65, 66]
and BankID is already used for loan document signing in two Norwegian banks,
DnBNOR and Postbanken.
Recommendations: Since one might reason about shopping patterns and where-
abouts from the receipts stored in the dSafe data stores, one must protect these
properly, with the right authentication level. The data stored by dSafe is not, per
se, defined as sensitive data by Norwegian law (see 3.2.2 for further discussions).
Since the data stored by dSafe in many ways are of the same nature as web based
financial solutions, and in addition open for reasoning around the purchase data,
one should – even though one can not make any financial transactions through the
dSafe system – require the same authentication level as an internet banking appli-
cation. Since all internet banking is recommended to use two-factor authentication
– which is not a requirement on level 1 and 2 – one must employ an eID-solution
with at least level 3 security.
One of the scope creeps identified is the electronic document signing functionality.
5A qualified electronic signature is an advanced electronic signature with additional require-
ments to the issuer of the eID and the signing equipment.
6See http://www.buypass.no/
7See http://www.commfides.no/
8See http://www.citz.com/
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It will sign and store legal documents for the signees, with their personal signatures.
dSafe should require a minimum level 3 eID for the receipt services. With regards
to the signature service, one should choose an eID provider with proven security
in accordance to Norwegian law (the ESL). At the time of implementation of this
service, at least the above mentioned providers should be reevaluated to ensure
adequate security and conformance to the levels set by established signing agencies
and law. For now, it seems that BankID, Commfides and Buypass are all adequate
solutions.
4.3.2.7 Virtualization
One of the major issues with cloud computing is the fact that the application
and the data are residing in an instance in the same environment as thousands
of other instances. What separates one instance from the other can be the use
of virtualisation – to allow the user to see the instance as a separated hardware
unit, without actually being physically separated. Due to the nature of the dSafe
application, it is highly dependent on being separated from other data, at least
logically. The in-depth study of the virtualisation technology for each vendor is
presented in Section 2.4.10
Both Azure and AWS rely on a customised, commercial hypervisor for the virtual
instances. Although somewhat different in architecture, the security they provide,
and the measures taken are similar. The main visible security characteristic that
separates the two are the more apparent possibility for the user to deploy third-
party security software on the AWS instance. The Azure hypervisor seems to
be more proprietary, both with regards to the closed-source hypervisor and the
lack of appearance of non-Microsoft security software. What separates the Google
AppEngine from the other vendors is the lack of hardware virtualisation, the type
of virtualisation relevant for, and addressed in, this study.
The instance separation is similar on Windows Azure and Amazon Web Services,
but the Google AppEngine application separation is not completely mapped out.
The virtual machine environments are built on proven technology, so separation
should be adequate. Google states to have included security measures in multiple
tiers, but this is strictly disclosed [67].
One of the other areas discussed in the virtualisation study was the management
interface security. The programmatic management interfaces (Azure and Amazon)
are protected by an authentication requiring a X.509 certificate and is encrypted
point-to-point by SSL. All web interfaces are protected by a one-factor password
authentication over SSL. Since Google does not provide instance management,
and therefore no management API, this yields no decisive difference regarding
management interface security.
Recommendations: The dSafe application is dependent on being hosted on a
completely compartmentalised environment in order to protect data. This is some-
thing that is addressed by all vendors, but not much is known about Google’s
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approach. Amazon is the only vendor providing extensive insight into virtuali-
sation implementation through the open-source hypervisor, therefore making this
approach seem recommendable. Azure use a customised version Hyper-V, technol-
ogy proven to be quite secure through extensive commercial use. The third-party
support of AWS is best-in-class. Since management interface security seems to
be similar for all three vendors, separation of instances and hypervisor proof-of-
quality seems similar for Azure and AWS. dSafe is recommended to use either
AWS or Azure. AppEngine may provide similar, or even better, security measures
on some of the characteristics studied, but no concrete information about these
implementations exist, so no conclusion is drawn with regards to AppEngine and
“virtualisation”.
4.4 Risk Mitigation
In this section mitigations are extracted from the preceding discussion. The fol-
lowing sections detail the reasoning for each domain while Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8
summarise the capabilities of respectively Microsoft, Amazon and Google. The
prefixes GOV and OP refer to governance and operational and are used to index
the three tables. The scenarios were described in Section 4.1.2.
Governance and Risk Management (GOV1)
The tables list that, for all assets, the vendors somewhat mitigate scenario two
through Terms of Service agreements that make guarantees as to how and when
employees access customer systems and six through all the measures they take to
be able to guarantee availability in their SLAs.
Legal and Electronic Discovery (GOV2)
Both Microsoft and Amazon mitigate the data asset scenarios one, three and five,
by offering a geolocalisation mechanism; the express ability to limit where data
is stored. By using the feature, the customer can partially mitigate the danger
inherent when data is distributed. Google unfortunately offers no such control.
Compliance and Audit (GOV3)
All three vendors somewhat mitigate scenarios one, two and three for all assets
and five for data assets by being SAS70 certified. Microsoft is ISO certified as well,
providing an even higher commitment to being open to how information is handled
and protected from unauthorised users.
83
4.4. RISK MITIGATION CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY
Information Lifecycle Management (GOV4)
Microsoft’s commitment to becoming ISO certified somewhat mitigates the two
first scenarios for all data assets. The certification documents include, among other
things, what happens with harddrives that are retired so dSafe can be assured that
their data on the decommissioned disks is not distributed to anyone.
Portability and Interoperability (GOV5)
We were unable to find any mitigations for the scenarios described within this do-
main. While Microsoft, for instance, has an SQL Migration Tool to ease migration
between platforms this does not increase the security of their platform.
Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (OP6)
All three vendors take their traditional security very seriously as we have previously
described. E.g. Microsoft specifies that their data centers have armed guards
protecting them [28].
Data Center Operations (OP7)
Again, both Microsoft and Amazon allow dSafe to control the data center in which
its data and services shall reside. Microsoft’s geolocalisation mechanism offers finer
granularity than Amazon’s equivalent feature. Therefore, Microsoft also somewhat
mitigates scenario six which deals with preventing unavailability.
Incident Response, Notification and Remediation (OP8)
In this domain we have focused on the logging and auditing capabilities of the
vendors. Both Microsoft and Amazon offer extensive API’s for enabling the creation
of SIEM systems (See Section 4.3.2.3).
Application Security (OP9)
None of the vendors are likely ever to allow their customers to do penetration testing
on their production environment. E.g. this is due to the aspect of co-tenancy and
thus understandable. However it means that none of the three vendors contribute
any mitigation in this aspect.
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Table 4.6: Microsoft Azure mitigations within the critical domains
Domaine Mitigatesa
Governance domains
GOV1 *:SC2b, *:SC6
GOV2 DA*:SC1c, DA*:SC3, DA*:SC5
GOV3 *:SC1, *:SC2, *:SC3, DA*:SC5
GOV4 DA*:SC1, DA*:SC2,
GOV5 N/A
Operational domains
OP6 *
OP7 *:SC5, *:SC6
OP8 *:SC2, *:SC3, *:SC4, *:SC5
OP9 N/A
OP10 DA*:SC1, DA*:SC3, PA1:SC1, PA2:SC1, PA4:SC1
OP11 N/A
OP12 *
a Annotated with asset and scenario: e.g. DA1:SC1.
b Valid for all assets for this/these scenario(s).
c Valid for all data assets for this/these scenario(s).
d Valid for all process assets this/these scenario(s).
e See Section 4.3
Encryption and Key Management (OP10)
Microsoft promotes SSL encryption by offering key management in Azure as well
as having created easy to use interfaces to create SSL protected services. This con-
tributes in mitigating eavesdropping (scenario one) and man-in-the-middle attacks
(scenario three) for all data assets as well as scenario one for process assets PA1,
PA2 and PA4.
Identity and Access Management (OP11)
None of the vendors provide authentication and identification facilities that are
satisfactory to dSafe’s needs.
Virtualisation (OP12)
All three vendors compartmentalise the applications running on their infrastruc-
ture. This contributes to mitigate every scenario for every asset. Exactly how
much is a more difficult question.
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Table 4.7: Amazon Web Services mitigations
within the critical domains
Domaine Mitigatesa
Governance domains
GOV1 *:SC2b, *:SC6
GOV2 DA*:SC1c, DA*:SC3, DA*:SC5
GOV3 *:SC1, *:SC2, *:SC3, DA*:SC5
GOV4 N/A
GOV5 N/A
Operational domains
OP6 *
OP7 *:SC5
OP8 *:SC2, *:SC3, *:SC4, *:SC5
OP9 N/A
OP10 N/A
OP11 N/A
OP12 *
a Annotated with asset and scenario: e.g. DA1:SC1.
b Valid for all assets for this/these scenario(s).
c Valid for all data assets for this/these scenario(s).
d Valid for all process assets this/these scenario(s).
e See Section 4.3
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Table 4.8: Google AppEngine mitigations
within the critical domains
Domaine Mitigatesa
Governance domains
GOV1 *:SC2b, *:SC6
GOV2 N/A
GOV3 *:SC1, *:SC2, *:SC3, DA*:SC5
GOV4 N/A
GOV5 N/A
Operational domains
OP6 *
OP7 N/A
OP8 N/A
OP9 N/A
OP10 N/A
OP11 N/A
OP12 *
a Annotated with asset and scenario: e.g.
DA1:SC1.
b Valid for all assets for this/these scenario(s).
c Valid for all data assets for this/these scenario(s).
d Valid for all process assets this/these scenario(s).
e See Section 4.3
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
As per our described approach we have been through a comparative study of cloud
vendor platforms, followed by a thorough run-down of dSafe’s challenges in the
cloud. Consequently, it is time to answer the questions from Section 1.1:
• Q1: Can information systems be as secure in the cloud as they would be in
an on-premises environment?
• Q2: How can the planned services of dSafe be sufficiently secured in the cloud?
5.1 Final Recommendations
In answering the second research questions we have made specific recommendations
as to how dSafe should proceed. The first recommendation related to governmental
operations is for dSafe to hire legal aid to analyse license agreements. dSafe needs
to thoroughly understand the license agreements of the vendor they choose to en-
sure that dSafe knows what it’s recourse is when security incidents occur. This is
not intended to directly neutralise the threats posed in the scenarios but it will help
dSafe in understanding any legal recourses that may be available if any scenarios
should occur. dSafe should also create an End-User License Agreement on order to
attain personal and informed consent from its users before storing their potentially
sensitive data. To ensure the prevention of data loss, dSafe must design and im-
plement procedures for performing backups and restoration of all their databases.
This can be done through creating a backup and recovery scheme. dSafe should be
acutely aware of how information flows through their system and, by proxy, the
chosen vendor’s system. Documenting the information lifecycle will contribute in
mitigating the risks of vendor employees snooping (scenario two). dSafe should
choose open protocols and standards to promote security and interoperability be-
tween cloud technologies, e.g. SAML and REST. With an ISO 27001-certified
vendor, dSafe can request documentation from the thorough certification process,
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through a written application. This will help in understanding the vendor’s infor-
mation lifecycle and security measures, contributing to mitigate scenario two.
The nature of the data handled by the receipt storage requires, by law, that the data
is kept within countries that implement EU Directive 95/46/EC. This requires a
vendor that allows explicit geolocation control. Hence, among the surveyed vendors,
Google is currently off-limits. To implement log analysis schemes so they can audit
access on the cloud resident system, a SIEM system should be employed. This
will facilitate further certification. dSafe needs to understand the magnitude of
threats in the public cloud compared to the private one. Outsourcing data center
operations enters a third party into the relationship that would otherwise only
consist of two parties; dSafe and their users. Hopefully, this report has aided them
in updating the threat/trust model, at least to the current situation. All assets
should be treated as if they are placed in a DMZ and therefore protect all assets
accordingly. This is imperative if dSafe’s information is to be placed in a public
cloud. This will indirectly help mitigate every scenario for every asset by assuming
that all assets need to be protected. As required by Norwegian law dSafe must
protect data in transit and ensure that only properly authenticated people are able
to access their data. Encryption is an excellent way to achieve this. dSafe should
implement level 3 authentication for their current design. When the scope creep
occurs, dSafe must reevaluate their solution according to Norwegian law. Level 3
will effectively mitigate scenarios one and two. Google does not seem to use any
established virtualisation technology in separating the applications of the customers
to ensure separation and compartementalisation, whilst Microsoft and Amazon use
proven commercial platform as a basis to achieve this – allowing dSafe to gain
deeper insight into the validity of these.
Furthermore, in Section 4.4 we went through all the domains and described how
the different vendors offer features that contribute in mitigating the risk scenar-
ios. While there is no way to accurately score the different vendors based on the
resulting tables it is our opinion that Microsoft seems to be the platform most
appropriate to dSafe’s needs.
Ultimately we find that dSafe’s information system can become sufficiently secure
if dSafe takes the new cloud-related risks into account. dSafe of course has to
evaluate which of these recommendations they want to follow, and hopefully they
will then be able to complete their information system in a secure manner.
5.2 Conclusions
It is our opinion, regarding the first research question, that systems can be built
to be secure in the cloud, but as with on-premises deployments these are not
necessarily secure by default. The security implications of the cloud have not yet
become completely transparent to the developer. Creating information systems
on cloud platforms requires even more diligence in security aspects compared to
non-cloud deployments due to this new set of challenges. Customers of cloud
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computing services include high profile businesses such as Netflix (movie rental
service on AWS), Siemens (software delivery service on Azure) and CapGemini
(SaaS applications from Google Apps). In addition, security heavy-hitter VeriSign
partner with Microsoft to enable encryption services on Windows Azure, thereby
publishing a justification for the use of said platform in security critical applications.
As we stated in Section 2.5, in most aspects, the vendors’ offerings are not sig-
nificantly different. After going through all twelve security domains, however, we
have found some important differences that lead to our conclusions. While Ama-
zon and Microsoft have specifically targeted the enterprise customers Google have
neglected them so far. The AppEngine for Business-program can change this in
the future but Amazon has had a mature and proven platform for nearly a decade.
Microsoft’s Windows Azure, though only recently launched, is almost up to par
with Amazon as far as their general feature sets go.
In Section 4.4 we summarised what risk scenarios the vendors mitigate in dSafe’s
case. While some of the reasons are specific to dSafe, there are also some that apply
in the general case. We made the case for why dSafe should choose a vendor that is
ISO 27001 certified. While we view this criteria as negotiable in dSafe’s case there is
one satisfactory vendor among the surveyed: Microsoft. Choosing Windows Azure
would put customers into relations with a vendor that is open (enough to pursue
this certification at least) about its information security practices and customers
should use the documentation produced during Microsoft’s certification process to
supplement their own documentation. Another general mitigation is that Microsoft
and Amazon both offer satisfactory APIs for logging needs and as such we do not
recommend one over the other. Google, however, exposes much less information in
their logging API.
Applications can become secure in the cloud, but this requires thorough risk analy-
sis and assessments of both application and vendors – together with guidelines that
apply to deploying to your chosen cloud platform. A framework designed specif-
ically for the process of migrating applications to the cloud should be employed
to ensure that all aspects are considered. What the cloud environment does not
change is that applications are still no more secure than they are designed to be,
regardless of residence, on-premises or in the cloud.
5.3 Further Work
Some areas were left unexplored in this study, due to the limitation of scope and
time. This section will give some final pointers to areas in interest of dSafe and
other companies migrating to the cloud.
5.3.1 Comprehensible Risk Analysis
As stated previously, the framework followed as a part of this study did not yield
a complete risk analysis, but a rather shallow one, directed at the risks of choosing
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one or the other cloud vendor with regards to the major assets of the application.
A complete risk analysis would not only encompass clear security issues, but also
business, judicial, and strategic risks associated with having an application residing
in the cloud. These analyses remain to be done.
5.3.2 Federated Identity
In Section 4.3.2.6, we discussed authentication with regards to the dSafe application
in the cloud. Some recommendations were given with respect to security levels of
receipt storage authentication and any future signing services. Different solutions
already exist to assist such an implementation, and federated secure identities are
currently available from companies such as Signicat. A study should be done to
map which solutions seem feasible with regards to security in implementation and
cost of use. The chosen solution should adhere to the recommendations given
regarding the security levels previously described and discussed.
5.3.3 Maturity of Cloud Technology
In this report, three cloud computing vendors are studied, but the concept of cloud
computing is not generally explored. To better understand the future development
of cloud computing, an effort should be put into understanding the future of this
model, how to meet the demands of the future, and how to grow securely in order
to meet tomorrow’s even more demanding security threats.
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Appendix B
Email Correspondence with
the Data Inspectorate
(Norwegian)
Til Datatilsynet:
Jeg skriver masteroppgave i informasjonssikkerhet og jobber for tiden med ISO27001-
standarden. Jeg har lett etter informasjon ang˚aende hvordan Datatilsynet forholder
seg til denne standarden n˚ar f.eks. et firma skal implementere og dokumentere sine
sikkerhetspolicyer. Kan dere hjelpe meg med dette?
Svar:
Til Mats Andreassen
Datatilsynet forholder seg normalt til kravet om internkontroll i personopplysningslovens
paragraf 14, jf. forskriftens kapittel tre. Men det er absolutt ingen bakdel a˚ benytte
ISO27001 for a˚ standardisere sine policyer, men det er ikke et krav fra v˚ar side ved
en eventuell kontroll.
Med Vennlig Hilsen Frank U Eriksen Overingeniør, Datatilsynet
Til Datatilsynet:
Hei.
Takk for raskt svar p˚a min forespørsel. Ja, jeg antok at ISO 27001 compliance
ikke er krav fra deres side, men det jeg egentlig er ute etter er om dere har satt
dere s˚apass godt inn i standarden til at dere kan finne p˚a a˚ /anbefale /det for
firmaer som skal vise sin compliance med nevnte paragraf 14. Hvis dere faktisk
anbefaler eller i det minste oppmuntrer til a˚ benytte standarden vil det p˚avirke
mine anbefalinger til det firmaet jeg behandler i min oppgave.
Svar: Vi oppmuntrer helt klart til a˚ bruke det hvis virksomheten ser det som
form˚alstjenlig med hensyn til størrelse, behov og eventuell sertifisering. Det vil
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helt klart hjelpe p˚a a˚ implementere internkontroll i en virksomhet med tanke p˚a
opplæring, avviksh˚andtering og revisjon.
Frank
Til Datatilsynet:
Det virker veldig fornuftig. En m˚a helt klart ta stilling til flere ting enn den
nevnte lovparagrafen n˚ar en bestemmer seg for a˚ g˚a for sertifisering, men de andre
faktorene er opp til firmaet a˚ vurdere. :)
Helt til slutt: kan jeg sitere deg i oppgaven min?
Svar:
Beklager. Det kan du :)
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